US Retail Sales Surge by Most in a Year as Spending Extends Beyond Gas
The value of overall retail purchases increased 1.7% following a revised 0.7% gain in February, according to a Commerce Department report published Tuesday. The data are not adjusted for inflation.
While the March increase was led by a record jump in spending on gas, nearly every category in the report — from furniture to electronics to general merchandise — posted increases.
That strength likely reflects larger-than-usual tax refunds flowing into households’ bank accounts in recent weeks. As a result, forecasters may boost estimates for first-quarter gross domestic product, which the Bureau of Economic Analysis will publish on April 30. (…)
Excluding gas stations, sales rose a firm 0.6%. Motor vehicle sales were up 0.5%. Receipts at restaurants and bars, the only service-sector category in the report, advanced 0.1%.
High-frequency card data have been mixed in recent weeks. Reports from PNC Financial Services Group Inc. and the Bank of America Institute pointed to strength in spending in discretionary categories such as travel and electronics, while Visa’s Spending Momentum Index suggested that — excluding gas — spending across discretionary, non-discretionary and restaurant categories declined.
The retail sales report showed so-called control-group sales — which feed into the government’s calculation of GDP — were up 0.7%, the most since August. The measure excludes food services, auto dealers, building materials stores and gasoline stations.
Americans are … Americans. We will get more data on income and spending Friday next week but March retail sales, with upward revisions in both January and February, tell us that Americans are still very much able and willing to spend.
Goldman Sachs estimates that real core retail sales rose at a 1.9% three-month annualized rate through March.
War-related inflation has yet to fully find its way into wallets but tax refunds are spent merrily.
The consumer is still spending, and this is partially due to larger tax refunds offsetting the initial hit from higher gasoline prices. Right now refunds are up over $40 billion versus last year, which is a 17% increase over the prior year. And the total number of refunds sent is up 3 million MORE versus the same time last year. So it would be hard to ignore this reality, especially as it relates to the state of spending today. (Wells Fargo)
Super Core retail sales are up 4.8% YoY in March:
(RBA Advisors)
The half-full glass view:
- My Tuesday post (Resilient!) warned about the sharp slowdown in real disposable income amid rising inflationary pressures from the war in Iran.
- But the retail sales data show that Americans, in aggregate, are not bothered much by the jump in gas prices.
- Ed Yardeni’s smart chart below, plotting the savings rate against wealth/disposable income, says that a savings rate below 4.0% should not be discounted given accumulating wealth.
- Continued strong consumer spending coupled with “solid” government expenditures would keep the economy humming through 2026 and possibly into 2027. The White House recently asked for a 42% increase in the Department of War’s budget for 2027.
The half-empty glass view:
- Assuming the above well stimulated economy, the resulting demand pull could fuel inflation higher and for longer than currently forecast by most economists and strategists, forcing the FOMC to raise interest rates. This could in turn boost the government’s interest payments, further aggravating the budget deficit.
- This “growthflation” scenario could spook leveraged investors in historically overvalued equities, potentially creating a negative wealth effect while lower-K Americans would still be in “coping mode”.
On April 15, a confident Ed Yardeni posted The Champagne Glass Is More Than Half Full:
Happy days are here again! (…)
The private credit bubble may be losing some air, but it isn’t bursting, while banks are still lending. Real GDP slowed during Q4-2025 and Q1-2026, but some of that was related to bad weather.
(…) it feels like the Roaring 2020s are back, given the strong V-shaped recovery in stock prices since March 30.
So what could possibly go wrong? Obviously, the war could flare up again. Oil exports might remain blockaded in the Arabian Gulf, causing oil prices to rise again. Let’s search for additional possible troubles in the economic reports of the past couple of days:
The Fed’s Beige Book was released today, covering data collected on or before April 6. The main message is that risks are skewed toward the inflation side of the Fed’s dual mandate:
- Labor markets held steady, with employment flat to slightly up in most districts (…). Wages remained modest to moderate across all districts, with no acceleration or deceleration reported.
- The most consequential shift from the March Beige Book is the energy price shock now hitting the economy. (…) The short-term inflation picture has clearly worsened. The Beige Book is broadly consistent with our view. The economy remains in good shape, but inflation risks have intensified.
- Major US banks kicked off the Q1 earnings season this week. Their CEOs’ commentary was uniformly upbeat about the US economy in Q1.
- The March NFIB survey of small business owners suggests that job openings may be bottoming. Hiring intentions have moderated to their long-run average. These readings are consistent with our view that the labor market remains in good shape, with supply and demand roughly in balance.
- The resilience of consumer spending is fully consistent with our upbeat economic outlook. Thanks to the 2025 One Big Beautiful Bill Act, the 2026 tax filing season is delivering a timely boost to consumers’ purchasing power.
I have great respect for Ed, a rare one-handed economist and strategist, but my current reading of Andrew Ross Sorkin’s great book “1929” is keeping me worried amid still expensive equity markets:
Yale professor Irving Fisher, described by the Los Angeles Times as “one of the nation’s leading economists and students of the market,” had become an intellectual celebrity of sorts for his groundbreaking work on monetary theory.
But what people loved most about Fisher was his unwavering, plainspoken optimism. He was not some mealymouthed academic muttering about storm clouds. He was a man who understood the times and spoke with a sense of confidence.
“Stock prices are not too high and Wall Street will not experience anything in the nature of a crash,” stated Fisher on September 5 [1929].
“We are living in an age of increasing prosperity and consequent increasing earning power of corporations and individuals. This is due in large measure to mass production and inventions such as the world never before has witnessed. The rapidity with which worthwhile inventions are brought out is the result of the tremendous research laboratories of our great industrial concerns.”
During other speeches in October, Fisher expressed confidence that productivity would help the economy:
“Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau…I do not feel there will be soon, if ever be, a 50 or 60 point break from present levels, such as [bears] have predicted. I expect to see the stock market a good deal higher within a few months.”
A few days later, Fisher expanded on that belief. “Even in the present high markets, the price of stocks have not yet caught up with their real values,” nor had the market “yet reflected the beneficent effects of Prohibition, which had made American workers more productive and dependable,” (…)
On October 15:
Hoover’s secretary of commerce, Robert P. Lamont also remained resolutely positive. “Industrial and commercial activity during the first nine months of 1929 continued on the same high level which has characterized American business during the past five years,” he said in a statement.
“The output of pig iron and steel ingots, usually regarded as an accurate reflector of industrial conditions, was more than 17 percent greater than in the corresponding period of the preceding year…Automobile production, often used as a measure of consumer purchasing power, was greater than any other similar period. Industrial employment was larger than in the same period of last year, while industrial payroll totals showed considerable expansion.”
In every measure the economy was showing remarkable stability, asserted Secretary Lamont. Like Fisher, he expressed no doubts about the state of America’s financial health. (…)
America’s future, Lamont continued, “appears brilliant…we have the greatest and soundest prosperity, and the best material resources…our great domestic market, our efficiency and our capital supplies make our securities the most desirable in the world.”
Inflation was not a problem in the roaring 1920s. Economists were rather worried about deflation risks.
Banking authorities were concerned by rampant speculation. From the Federal Reserve History:
The Roaring Twenties roared loudest and longest on the New York Stock Exchange. Share prices rose to unprecedented heights. The Dow Jones Industrial Average increased six-fold from sixty-three in August 1921 to 381 in September 1929. (…)
The financial boom occurred during an era of optimism. Families prospered. Automobiles, telephones, and other new technologies proliferated. Ordinary men and women invested growing sums in stocks and bonds.
A new industry of brokerage houses, investment trusts, and margin accounts enabled ordinary people to purchase corporate equities with borrowed funds. Purchasers put down a fraction of the price, typically 10 percent, and borrowed the rest. The stocks that they bought served as collateral for the loan. Borrowed money poured into equity markets, and stock prices soared. (…)
The governors of many Federal Reserve Banks and a majority of the Federal Reserve Board believed stock-market speculation diverted resources from productive uses, like commerce and industry. The Board asserted that the “Federal Reserve Act does not … contemplate the use of the resources of the Federal Reserve Banks for the creation or extension of speculative credit”. (…)
The Federal Reserve decided to act. The question was how. The Federal Reserve Board and the leaders of the reserve banks debated this question. To rein in the tide of call loans, which fueled the financial euphoria, the Board favored a policy of direct action. The Board asked reserve banks to deny requests for credit from member banks that loaned funds to stock speculators. The Board also warned the public of the dangers of speculation.
The governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, George Harrison, favored a different approach. He wanted to raise the discount lending rate. This action would directly increase the rate that banks paid to borrow funds from the Federal Reserve and indirectly raise rates paid by all borrowers, including firms and consumers. In 1929, New York repeatedly requested to raise its discount rate; the Board denied several of the requests.
In August the Board finally acquiesced to New York’s plan of action, and New York’s discount rate reached 6 percent.
The Federal Reserve’s rate increase had unintended consequences. Because of the international gold standard, the Fed’s actions forced foreign central banks to raise their own interest rates. Tight-money policies tipped economies around the world into recession. International commerce contracted, and the international economy slowed.
The financial boom, however, continued. The Federal Reserve watched anxiously. Commercial banks continued to loan money to speculators, and other lenders invested increasing sums in loans to brokers. In September 1929, stock prices gyrated, with sudden declines and rapid recoveries. Some financial leaders continued to encourage investors to purchase equities, including Charles E. Mitchell, the president of the National City Bank (now Citibank) and a director of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In October, Mitchell and a coalition of bankers attempted to restore confidence by publicly purchasing blocks of shares at high prices. The effort failed. Investors began selling madly. Share prices plummeted. (…)
While New York’s actions protected commercial banks, the stock-market crash still harmed commerce and manufacturing. The crash frightened investors and consumers. Men and women lost their life savings, feared for their jobs, and worried whether they could pay their bills. Fear and uncertainty reduced purchases of big ticket items, like automobiles, that people bought with credit. Firms—like Ford Motors—saw demand decline, so they slowed production and furloughed workers. Unemployment rose, and the contraction that had begun in the summer of 1929 deepened. (…)
Today, worries are about inflation, although speculation is very much present.
This next chart plots the Federal Reserve Margin Loans data which shows lower total margin debt because “it does not fully capture margin-like lending from large bank holding companies to entities like hedge funds.”
The chart, going back to 1965, allows to also plot margin debt against disposable income.
Note the explosion of margin debt (through Q4’25) since the pandemic (FINRA +65%, Fed: +100%). While margin debt is tiny vs income, it’s up 50% since the pandemic and is now in line with the 1999-2008 period of speculative excesses that eventually led to sharp deleveraging (selling) when equity markets turned.
Not a timing tool, but a measure of speculative behavior, warning of the risk if and when fear comes back.
Speculation nowadays is not only seen in margin loan numbers. Here’s a non-exhaustive list of recent “investment tools” offered by your friendly broker:
- Zero-Day Options Tools.
- Leveraged ETFs to potentially gain 2x or 3x exposure to equity markets.
- Single-Stock Leveraged ETFs allowing retail traders to gain 2x or 3x exposure to specific high-momentum companies.
- Event Trading tools to amplify bets on specific binary events, such as earnings reports or Fed interest rate decisions, or just about anything.
During his confirmation hearing last week, Kevin Warsh explicitly criticized QE as a policy that fuels asset price inflation and benefits wealthy asset holders while distorting market signals.
He advocated for a “radical” reduction of the Fed’s $6.7 trillion balance sheet, stating that the central bank’s massive footprint in the bond market distorts financial conditions and creates “market noise” that confuses investors.
He said that the Fed’s communications encourage market participants to over-rely on central bank promises rather than real economic data.
In effect, he wants a radical reduction in liquidity and the elimination of the “Fed put”, both encouraging speculative behavior. FOMC meetings will get lively.
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