What the Democrats can seek to achieve (ING)
Key sectors of corporate America will be nervous that Democratic control of important oversight committees could bring greater scrutiny. More congressional hearings involving AI and technology business leaders would be a likely outcome, while a strong performance at the ballot box may embolden local Democratic leaders to try to stall unpopular data centre construction in their constituencies. Fossil fuel producers may face similar challenges.
Democrats will likely feel even more confident about pushing back against President Trump’s policies on Iran, support of Israel and any escalation of tariffs. They may apply more pressure on the president to sound tougher towards Russia and to provide support to Ukraine, but the final call will remain with the president.
Investigations into President Trump, his family and members of his administration may also be stepped up as Democrats exercise their greater powers. Inquiries into finances and business dealings could result in subpoenas for documents and testimony. Moreover, impeachment proceedings begin in the House, raising the possibility of a third attempt to impeach the president.
To be convicted and removed from office, 67 of the 100 senators would need to vote in favour, which is unlikely. The Democrats could still use the process to constrain the president, but doing so risks further toxifying the political situation in the US. Rather than pursuing such action against the president himself, Democrats could instead launch investigations into members of his cabinet.
With Democrats now in control of the Senate, they can block or, at the very least, stall judicial and executive nominees. This includes heads of government agencies, ambassadors and cabinet members, potentially making it difficult for the president to replace any senior officials he chooses to fire.
What will the president do?
A key question is whether a constrained President Trump, entering the final phase of his tenure, becomes more willing to accept political or market disruption in pursuit of his objectives.
If there is little sense of any compromise, the ensuing gridlock in Congress would leave the president to focus on areas where he can exercise executive power: 1) foreign policy and diplomacy, including trade policy, 2) national security and defence, 3) law enforcement and regulatory policy, 4) personnel appointments (subject to Senate approval), and 5) administration and management policy.
This suggests Iran, Russia/Ukraine and tariffs/trade policy are likely to be the focus for the president. Tariff policy could increasingly be used to incentivise foreign partners to align with US foreign policy objectives, for example by pressuring NATO members to increase defence spending.
More fundamentally, heavy defeats in the House and Senate will be interpreted as a referendum on President Trump’s policies and potentially prompt figures within the Republican Party to take the view that it is time to open the debate on its future direction.
With Trump’s influence set to fade, leading lights within the party, most notably JD Vance and Marco Rubio, may attempt to shore up support for their own campaigns as they look to the 2028 presidential election. Similarly, a large Democratic victory will intensify speculation over whether the party’s 2028 candidate should come from its more moderate wing or whether the progressive left has enough momentum to put forward a candidate of its own.
The market reaction
The initial bond market reaction has been a fall in yields across the curve. In the coming days, that could reverse as the prospect of policy stasis leaves the market weighing a still-elevated fiscal deficit against some easing of inflation concerns.
We will probably see front-end yields drift lower, while the back end retains an upside bias. If we do see more tariffs, the back end could find a small silver lining in the additional tax revenues. But any benefit is likely to be marginal, given the risk that tariffs also push inflation higher. Overall, we retain a bias towards the 10-year yield heading towards 5.25%.
The dollar is softer on the outcome, though it has recovered from its lows seen in early Asia when a sharp fall in Nasdaq futures was warning of a larger re-pricing of the tech story. Nasdaq futures have since retraced the majority of those losses. Limiting a larger dollar correction on this news is probably a still-resilient US economy and at least one more rate hike from the Federal Reserve.
The dollar could see a little more weakness into 2027, however, if an emboldened Democratic Party takes greater issue with Republican policy, including deregulation and the AI build-out. And the potential for a prolonged government shutdown in mid-2027 adds to the case for a weaker dollar next summer.
What it means for Europe and China
With the outcome of the vote limiting President Trump’s options at home, he is likely to focus more heavily on foreign and trade policy. The result could be greater volatility and uncertainty for the global economy.
This will clearly affect Europe. A forced deal between Russia and Ukraine, to the disadvantage of Ukraine and Europe, could undermine economic sentiment in Europe. A new escalation in the Middle East would push up energy prices and harm the European economy. Europe’s latest shift towards more protectionist trade policies could bring new global trade tensions.
At the same time, with only two years left in office, the TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out) phenomenon could increasingly shape Europe’s thinking. The risk of an unwarranted economic accident rises as Trump’s policies towards Europe become more aggressive and Europe’s own stance hardens, in the hope that Trump will ultimately back down or simply run out of time.
If Republicans lay the blame for the poor result at the president’s door, the sense that Trump’s time is coming to an end could grow stronger. If so, some European countries may be tempted to test the president’s patience and slow the pace of defence spending increases, particularly given their own fiscal constraints. Alternatively, and less likely, a stifled but less angry Trump administration could try to bring the wars in Iran and Ukraine to an end.
Constrained by Congress and the Supreme Court on trade, it could ultimately, intentionally or otherwise, end up indirectly supporting the European economy.
China’s main response will be to wait and see, as it will react to actual policy changes rather than the shifts within Congress. The main potential trigger points would be Taiwan arms sales, tariffs and other trade/investment restrictions.
Personal ties between the two leaders appear good, but with President Trump’s policy focus being channelled towards foreign and trade policy, China could end up in the crosshairs again. The trade truce is set to expire in January, and it seems like both sides are not interested in going back to the mutually destructive peak tariff scenario we had in 2025, but it cannot be ruled out.
As with Europe, if Trump appears weakened by the outcome of the midterms, China could sense that it is time to start looking beyond 2028, triggering a revaluation of its long-term US strategy.
U.S. Job Openings Rose in September
Available positions rose to 7.5 million in September from a upwardly revised 7.2 million in August. The number and rate of layoffs and discharges also were little changed at 1.6 million and 1%, respectively.
Here’s the most interesting part:
Voluntary quits spiked by 321,000 MoM in September, up 12.5% YoY.
- People generally quit for better conditions, generally salary. Job switchers’ wages rose 4.7% in September from +3.7% in May. The gap with total wage growth has widened considerably lately.
- More quits leave more job openings to be filled, potentially at higher wages in low unemployment conditions.
AI CORNER
Data Center Construction: How Are Fifth District Businesses Involved?
The Fifth District is home to more than 20 percent of the nation’s data centers, and development continues to accelerate, reflecting the industry’s expanding physical presence across the region. (…)
Among survey respondents, businesses directly involved in data center construction reported average input cost growth of 9.7 percent over the last year, compared with roughly 6.7 percent for indirectly involved firms and uninvolved businesses.
Growth in prices charged to customers followed a similar but slightly lower pattern across involvement levels: Directly involved firms reported an average growth of 6.4 percent, followed by indirectly involved firms at 5 percent, and not involved firms at 4.5 percent.
Annual wage growth showed a similar pattern. Businesses directly and indirectly involved in data center construction experienced wages rise by 4.2 percent and 4 percent, respectively, over the last year, while uninvolved businesses experienced a smaller increase of 3.4 percent.
These results suggest that survey respondents closer to data center construction faced greater increases in cost, prices, and wages, though price increases did not fully keep up with the pace of rising input costs.
Among firms directly involved in data center construction, the share expecting to increase employment exceeded the share expecting to decrease employment by 14 percentage points. The corresponding gap is 11 percentage points for indirectly involved firms and 5 percentage points for firms not involved. Overall, firms involved in data center construction in any capacity are more likely, on net, to expect employment growth over the next six months.
A Cleveland Fed mid-September survey found a higher share of firms involved in data center construction (47% vs 31%. Different questions:
- 81% of respondents said their firms had used AI for business processes or tasks in the past six months, compared to 74% who said the same in March 2026. Over the next six months, 81% said they plan to use AI for business processes or tasks, compared to 79% who said the same in March.
- Most firms that reported using AI in the past six months said their use of AI did not change their staffing levels. 11% said their AI use had increased their staffing levels in the past six months, compared to 2% who said AI had decreased their staffing levels. These responses were similar to those collected in March 2026.
- Firms most often said AI helped them improve efficiency and productivity (82%), and a smaller majority said AI helped them enhance decision making (66%). Across all benefits of AI use, firms were more likely to say AI would help them achieve the benefit in the future than to say AI was currently helping them achieve the benefit.
CAPITAL IS CAPITAL
The AI Boom May Be Sowing Seeds of Another Financial Crisis
Bill Dudley is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and a former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
(…) The risk of another GFC seems low. First, concerns about an AI bust are prevalent. (…)
Second, the financing of the AI investment boom seems more robust. (…) most of the funding for the AI boom has a longer tenure that is better matched to the assets being financed. (…)
That said, there are characteristics of the AI boom that are concerning. In particular, it is not easy to assess counterparty exposures and how those exposures might change if the outlook for investment returns or the financing environment were to worsen. And financing terms are often complex and opaque.
Much of the financing activity is being executed through leasing structures, which stay off the balance sheet until the data center infrastructure is completed.
Also, the financing, at times, has “wrong way” risk. For example, if Nividia guarantees of future chip values were triggered, it would be happening at the same time its margins would be crashing because of lower chip prices.
So what can be done?
First, securities regulators should be given an explicit financial stability mandate. (…) it is important that there is a regulatory body that takes responsibility and works to identify the emerging risks.
Second, banking and securities regulators should take steps to increase transparency. Who owes what to whom and under what conditions and contingencies? (…)
Third, there should be a review of accounting practices to ensure that they fairly represent the exposure and risks. (…) Rules that required a fuller disclosure of actual and contingent liabilities would help investors make more informed decisions, which would constrain undue risk-taking. (…)
(…) “We know that society will use dramatically more computing power in the future,” that demand for chips will remain strong, “and that AI capabilities are improving at an extraordinary rate,” Apollo President Jim Zelter said on a call with analysts Tuesday following its third-quarter results. “What we don’t know is how pricing and economics will evolve.”
Zelter said the firm’s defensive posture will mean focusing more on secured lending and senior debt, and setting strict limits on its exposure to specific borrowers. Chief Executive Officer Marc Rowan said the firm is seeing high valuations across markets and elevated risk, driving the decision to play defense.
“FOMO is not an investment strategy,” Rowan said on the call, referring to the fear of missing out. “We are prudent and we are cautious, especially in credit.”
The firm’s subsidiary Athene disclosed in an Oct. 30 filing that it has invested $12.9 billion in digital infrastructure as of Sept. 30. The firm broke down its exposure to each borrower and the asset class tied to the sector, while emphasizing that most of the investments were secure and investment grade. The overall exposure doesn’t include any unfunded debt that Apollo has already committed.
For Athene, its largest AI-related investments include $3.1 billion of exposure to SpaceX, $2.4 billion to Oracle Corp., $2.3 billion to Meta Platforms Inc. and $1.1 billion to Anthropic PBC and Broadcom Inc. The exposures don’t capture the full picture, as the Broadcom debt portion represents just one of several installments that Apollo has committed to the chip firm for its leasing agreement with Anthropic. (…)
Apollo co-led a $40 billion financing for SpaceX last week to fund its purchase of AI chips, and earlier this year it led a $35 billion deal for Broadcom and Anthropic.
Athene also said it caps investment-grade exposure to any single issuer at 1% to 1.5% of gross invested assets, aggregating investments across different structures.
Zelter said Apollo is prioritizing investments that are more senior in the capital structure and taking a more defensive posture in the loans the firm’s making.
“The logical conclusion is to take risk off, position defensively and prepare for the opportunity to play offense,” Zelter said.
FYI:
Oracle completed a roughly $20 billion stock-and-bond sale for AI data centers, pricing $9.9 billion of new stock at $116 a share, an 11% discount to Friday’s close, alongside $10 billion of bonds with yields reaching 8.65%, to fund data-center construction.
The raise landed as the industry’s cash math drew fresh scrutiny: quarterly filings from Microsoft, Alphabet, Meta and Amazon show combined operating cash flow of $175.5 billion against $201.9 billion of capital spending, more than double the year-ago total, leaving aggregate free cash flow of negative $26.4 billion for the September quarter, the first negative combined reading on record, according to the Kobeissi Letter.
The aggregate masks wide differences: Microsoft generated $18.6 billion of free cash flow, while Amazon’s was negative $34.8 billion on $77.3 billion of capital spending, and all four hold large cash reserves.
OpenAI, meanwhile, has secured about $11 billion toward a $30 billion funding target at a $1.25 trillion valuation, the Wall Street Journal reported; the round remains open. (Rock & Turner)
China Services Gauge Unexpectedly Dips for First Time Since July
The RatingDog China services purchasing managers’ index slipped to 50.8 in October, the lowest in three months, according to a statement published Wednesday. (…)
Days earlier, the official PMI survey showed the services industry slid slightly in October to the 50 mark that separates expansion from contraction. The private and official surveys cover different sample sizes, locations and business types, with the RatingDog report focusing on small and medium-sized firms. (…)
More from the releases:
New business received by Chinese service providers expanded further, extending the current growth sequence that began in January 2023, with the pace of increase solid and little changed from September, helped by successful business development efforts and new client wins. New export business rose for the sixth consecutive month, further extending the longest growth streak seen since 2024 amid improving overseas demand conditions, though the rate of growth eased from September and was marginal overall.
China’s manufacturing output expanded at a rate that was sharp and the fastest in six months, underpinned by another solid increase in new work inflows. According to panellists, October’s demand growth was driven by the launch of new products and improvements in production capabilities, while firms’ own business development efforts also bore fruit.
Exporters also reported higher sales volumes at the start of the fourth quarter, albeit with the rate of growth slowing from September’s high.
In line with the trend for output, the rate of buying activity growth accelerated from September and was the strongest in eight months.
On prices, average charges fell in October after rising in September. According to survey respondents, intense competition and a slower increase in input costs enabled firms to lower selling prices to support sales.
This was likewise the case for exports as average export charges declined for the first time in nearly a year. Where operating expenses did increase, however, this was attributed to higher raw material, such as for metals, and fuel costs.
Eurozone growth eases to four-month low
The seasonally adjusted S&P Global Eurozone Composite PMI® Output Index fell for the first time since May. Posting 51.7, the headline index remained in growth territory, extending the current period of economic expansion in the eurozone to four months. That said, by falling from September’s 53.1, it signalled a softer increase that was also the weakest over this period.
Sector data signalled a broad-based growth slowdown as both manufacturing and services output levels rose at softer rates. (…)
Weighing on business activity was a marked softening of sales growth. The volume of new business received by private sector firms in the eurozone rose only marginally during October as a slight decline in demand for services was only narrowly offset by an expansion to factory order books. Export conditions were still supportive, as indicated by a third successive rise in new business from abroad, although the upturn here also lost pace.
Eurozone companies were able to keep on top of workloads in October as outstanding business volumes were broadly unchanged. This was achieved despite workforce numbers ticking down from September. Although job cuts were only marginal, the rate of decline signalled was the most pronounced since May. The service sector drove this reduction as factory headcounts rose slightly.
Cost pressures intensified across the eurozone economy during October. The rate of input price inflation accelerated again, bringing it up to a five-month high. Output charges were raised sharply, although the pace of increase did soften from September.
Lastly, eurozone firms’ year-ahead expectations weakened at the start of the fourth quarter. This marked the third successive month that business sentiment has softened. Overall, the level of business confidence remained historically weak, coming in below its long-run average.
Costs seem to be rising faster than output prices.
Oracle cancels $7bn Tencent AI deal under Trump pressure Intervention comes amid growing tension for US AI infrastructure groups doing business with Chinese tech giants
Oracle has scrapped a multibillion-dollar chip leasing contract with Tencent after bowing to pressure from the Trump administration, in a sign of rising tensions for US cloud providers serving Chinese AI companies.
The Californian group led by billionaire Trump backer Larry Ellison signed a five-year lease with the leading Chinese tech giant to provide access to as many as 100,000 advanced AI chips across a host of data centres in south-east Asia. The contract, worth an estimated $7bn and first reported by the FT in September, was Tencent’s largest overseas leasing deal.
It would have given the group access to chips unavailable for use in China due to curbs from Washington and Beijing.
US officials approached Oracle to raise concerns about the Tencent deal, according to two people familiar with the matter. Tencent also received visits from top officials in Guangdong, where the group is based, who asked the tech giant to support domestic Chinese chips, according to one of the people.
The deal has since been cancelled, the people added. (…)
While Tencent is catching up with multibillion leasing deals, ByteDance and Alibaba remain the biggest clients of data centres in south-east Asia.
Oracle is a major supplier to ByteDance in Asia with multiple data centres in Malaysia. The company also hosted US customer data for the Chinese group’s social media platform TikTok before being part of a consortium that late last year acquired the reel-based app’s US operations. (…)
Tit-for-Tat:
China’s Message to Its Rivals: You Need What We Make It’s not just rare earths. China is making it harder for other countries to shed their dependence on its solar, drone and drugmaking technology.
(…) In the past month, Beijing has moved to control the exports of dozens of technologies, including drones, artificial intelligence models and agents, and certain processes used to develop advanced medicines and to make solar panels.
The overall push could make it much harder for companies in the United States and elsewhere to set up solar energy equipment factories that would compete against Chinese manufacturers. And it could soon make it more difficult for anyone outside China to gain access to the latest and most powerful Chinese A.I. models. (…)
For Xi Jinping, the Chinese leader, the controls are the realization of a plan he laid out years ago, when the pandemic exposed China’s dependence on foreign countries for advanced medical equipment like ventilators and life-support systems, as well as for raw materials and specialized parts.
He declared that China would develop “trump card” technologies in industries such as high-speed trains, renewable energy and telecommunications. That would make China not only more self-sufficient, but deter countries from trying to cut China off.
Beijing needs leverage to ensure that China can still get what it needs from other countries — namely their customers and advanced technologies like jet engines and high-end chips, said Kirsten Asdal, a founder of Asdal Advisory, a consultancy that focuses on Chinese political research. (…)
In a recent front-page editorial commemorating the 90th anniversary of the Long March, People’s Daily, the party’s mouthpiece, called for the country to “focus on the ‘chokehold’ key core technologies” and “stiffen the Chinese backbone” of self-reliance.
In a clear reference to the United States, the editorial praised China for weathering tariffs and trade wars and urged readers to prepare for a “great struggle.” (…)
China has said that the recent flurry of export controls and proposed rules are needed to protect Chinese business interests. The country has spent decades and billions of dollars developing its dominance of the manufacturing of solar equipment, for instance, and it argues that it must restrict the export of core equipment to prevent competitors from trying to replicate China’s supply chain domestically.
China has also said that more controls are needed to guard against threats to national security.
“China is beginning to more systematically consider which technologies and equipment can be exported, to whom they should be sold and what their ultimate applications will be,” said Sun Chenghao, a foreign relations expert at Tsinghua University in Beijing.
He said, for instance, that the risks that A.I. could be used for cyberattacks or that machines that bore tunnels and that dredge mud could be used by militaries against China are legitimate reasons for Beijing to vet where these technologies go.
The proposed controls may also be a part of tit-for-tat actions that China and the United States have traded in recent months, despite a broader trade truce. The Trump administration added BGI, a major Chinese genomics company to a trade blacklist aimed at barring products made with forced labor in China. Earlier, the Treasury Department proposed regulations prohibiting U.S. companies and investors from taking investment stakes in Chinese biotechnology firms.
President Trump and Mr. Xi are expected to meet in China later this month and next month in Miami.
American restrictions and sanctions on China helped teach Beijing that great powers need economic weapons as much as they need aircraft carriers and long-range missiles, some analysts have said. Washington first cut two of China’s largest technology companies, Huawei and ZTE, off from American chips and software, then restricted exports of advanced chips to China broadly, curbs that continue to hurt China’s A.I. ambitions.
During its trade war with the second Trump administration, Beijing choked off exports to the United States of rare earths, the minerals needed to make fighter jets, cars and everyday technologies. That pressured Washington into a truce.
Some Chinese analysts worry that Beijing’s rare earths strategy has been too successful. The United States and many of its allies and partners are now scrambling to develop alternative sources.
Part of last month’s flood of Chinese controls was aimed at establishing new points of leverage.
“China is concerned that it might lose its ‘rare earths card,’” said Zhao Minghao, an international relations scholar at Fudan University in Shanghai. “So, what other cards does China still hold? How can China effectively counter U.S. sanctions or tariff measures? I believe Beijing is prioritizing this highly at the present.” (…)
The new controls could also alarm other trading partners like Europe, which is already uneasy about a flood of cheap Chinese exports. (…)
“China is indiscriminately expanding the scope of their export controls to include basic equipment that aren’t even strategic,” he added. “They are demonstrating that in any political conflict, they can counter with industrial leverage.”
“That kind of business by threat is not going to be something that is sustainable,” Mr. Kennedy said. (…)
Indeed. But how will it end?
- Japan ‘months’ from running out of critical rare earth as China squeezes supply Tokyo asks US to help convince Beijing to ease chokehold on yttrium and avert manufacturing shutdown
(…) Washington has urged China in recent months to increase the flow of rare earths, including yttrium — a heat-resistant metal crucial to manufacturing vehicles, jet engines and semiconductors — to the US and its allies. US defence supply chains rely on components made in Japan that contain yttrium.
Unless Beijing changes tack or western allies find substitutes or additional stockpiles, shortages could emerge as early as the end of this year, Japanese government officials and trading house executives said.
“We’re in a serious situation to keep supplying downstream industries,” said a Japanese government official. “Stockpiles are decreasing and rare earth saving efforts have a limit.” (…)
Yttrium shortages have become the biggest pain point for Japanese materials groups. The metal is used to coat engines and plasma-etching chambers for chip manufacturing.
Yttrium oxide prices outside China have skyrocketed to $1,150 per kilogramme, a 179-fold increase versus two years ago, compared with $9 per kilogramme in China, according to price assessments by Argus. (…)
US officials have told Beijing that the US will not export jet engines needed for the Comac C919 — China’s first domestically made airliner — as production has been constrained by the lack of yttrium, which is critical to making turbines.
China also agreed to buy 200 Boeing jets when Trump visited Beijing in May. But the deal has not been completed, partly due to complications related to critical minerals.
Erin Browne, the top US Treasury official for international affairs, told the FT that rare earths were essential to the production of Boeing aircraft and jet engines. “In order to produce aircraft, you need rare earths,” said Browne. “They’re all sort of under the same umbrella, which is that in order to . . . export engines, you also need rare earths.” (…)
“It is rightful panic in Japan,” said Gracelin Baskaran, head of the critical minerals security programme at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “They are probably going to have to suffer for the time being.”
A high stakes poker game in which chips are not in the center of the table but integral parts of anyone’s hand. Like dirt.
Trump’s American slapdown for the ages In multiple midterm races the president’s heavy-handed input boomeranged
The FT’s Edward Luce:
Tuesday night looks like the beginning of the end of Donald Trump. His response to what amounts to America’s stinging personal midterm rebuke is likely to be volatile. Yet it is hard to see how he could claw his way back from such a strong Democratic wave having urged voters to act as though his name were on the ballot.
Against advice, Trump turned the elections into a referendum on him. He thus owns the historic scale of the Republican defeat.
There were plenty of other losers on Tuesday night. Elon Musk, who pumped more than $200mn of his own money into the Texas Senate race, learnt that even historically large donations can’t buy you love or results against so strong a public swing. His candidate, Ken Paxton, lost to Democratic nominee James Talarico, who was not even born the last time a Democrat won a Texas Senate seat.
It was also a disastrous night for the once-powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee, which spent a lot of money trying to defeat Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan. El-Sayed is set to become the first Muslim senator in US history having also got the votes of a majority of Michigan’s Jewish vote, according to exit polls.
It was also a terrible night for Vivek Ramaswamy, the bombastic Trump understudy, who was defeated in Ohio’s gubernatorial race. He might now bow out from politics having spent a large chunk of his personal fortune on what was seen only a few months ago as a safe bet.
Likewise, the late Lindsey Graham would be turning in his proverbial grave to watch his recently appointed sister, Darline Graham, lose his long-held South Carolina seat to a Democrat — the first time the party has won a Senate race there in almost 30 years.
Many other landmarks will be passed in America’s 2026 midterms in what early numbers suggest was a historically high turnout. America seems finally to have fallen out of Trump’s spell.
In each race, Trump’s heavy-handed input boomeranged. (…)
Not only did Trump thrust himself into the centre of each news cycle; he went out of his way to belittle the electorate’s chief concerns. Affordability was a “Dumocrat [sic] hoax”, Trump insisted. Though the Iran war and its inflationary effects was a dominant theme, Trump told voters he had kept every promise. One of those was to avoid wars in the Middle East.
Some believe that he showed clear signs of cognitive decline. “I’ve actually kept far more promises than I made,” Trump cryptically suggested the day before the election. (…)
Democrats will now control both chambers of the US Congress in a result that even Trump might find “too big to rig”.
There are two immediate consequences. The first is that the Republican campaign to replace him as the 2028 nominee will begin straightaway. Indeed, Ron DeSantis, the outgoing governor of Florida, arguably kicked that off before the polls had even closed. Without naming Trump, he said no public official should make money from holding office. That suggests an anti-corruption backlash following an election where that theme topped many recent polls.
The second consequence is that Trump’s unpredictability is likely to become an even larger feature of his presidency. To those who oppose him, Tuesday night was a lightning strike. But Trump is rarely outbid in the drama stakes.
Whichever way he reacts, the 2026 result will change America’s course. The 2018 Republican midterm defeat was the end of Trump’s beginning, to borrow Churchill’s phrase. This week’s high turnout a decade after Trump descended that escalator spells the beginning of his end.
BTW: “I really want you to pretend I’m on the ballot,” Trump said at his final rally Sunday in Salina, Kansas.
“Trump says GOP losses are because he’s not on the ballot. The president’s first comments on midterm results.”
“I have the ultimate power — it’s called ‘veto,'” he told CBS News, even saying he would welcome the nickname “Mr. Veto.”
But Dems need a strong leader, quick. Any idea?
“The immediate financial effects of a Democratic sweep aren’t that great. Pricing in risks for 2028 that weren’t previously taken seriously, however, threatens to be a big deal.” (John Authers)

