The enemy of knowledge is not ignorance, it’s the illusion of knowledge (Stephen Hawking)

It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so (Mark Twain)

Invest with smart knowledge and objective odds

THE DAILY EDGE (27 September 2018):

Fed Raises Interest Rates, Signals One More Increase This Year Benchmark federal-funds rate increased to a range between 2% and 2.25%

(…) Projections released after Wednesday’s meeting show that most Fed officials expect they will raise rates by one percentage point through next year, and most officials penciled in at least one more quarter-point increase for 2020.

That would leave the benchmark rate slightly higher than 3.25%. (…)

Economic projections released after the meeting envision an unusually favorable set of conditions, in which the unemployment rate holds below 4% over the next three years but inflation never rises far beyond the Fed’s 2% target. (…)

The risk that inflation climbs higher and faster than anticipated could require the Fed to raise rates “a little bit quicker,” Mr. Powell said. He quickly added, “We don’t see that. We really don’t see that.” (…)

“If this, perhaps inadvertently, goes to a place where we have widespread tariffs that remain in place for a long time, a more protectionist world, that’s going to be bad for the United States’s economy,” said Mr. Powell. (…)

Given their large share of global output, “the performance of the emerging market economies really matters to us in carrying out our domestic mandate,” said Mr. Powell.

 

Source: Natixis (via The Daily Shot)

Here’s core PCE inflation since 1994:

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BTW:

U.S. New Home Sales Increase As Prices Decline

New single-family home sales increased 3.5% (12.7% y/y) during August to 629,000 (SAAR) from 608,000 in July, revised from 627,000. June’s sales level also was revised lower to 618,000 from 638,000. Sales during August were 11.7% below the high of 712,000 reached in November 2017.

The median price of a new home declined 2.4% to $320,200 (+1.9% y/y) from a little-revised $328,100. The average price of a new home eased slightly to $388,400 (+5.2% y/y). (…)

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Global Trade Growth Is Slowly Losing Steam

(…) In a report on Thursday, DHL said its trade barometer weakened in September, dropping to the lowest since 2016 and indicating a slower pace of growth in the months ahead. It noted “rising political tensions.” (…)

Source: Capital Economics (via The Daily Shot)

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An Economic Cold War is Looming Some observers suspect that Washington’s ultimate goal is to permanently disentangle America’s economy from China’s

(…) The situation has no precedent in post-war history. The U.S. had few economic ties to the Soviet Union, so their strategic rivalry seldom spilled over to trade. America’s trade disputes with Japan carried no security fallout because the two are military allies. By contrast, Washington worries that China’s use of cybertheft, trade barriers and forced technology transfer not only confer economic advantage but make it a more formidable geostrategic adversary. (…)

Tariffs and other penalties, such as forthcoming restrictions on the export of key technologies, weaken China’s appeal as a destination for foreign investment and start to unravel the supply chains that tie the U.S. to China. The longer tariffs remain in place, the more multinationals that want to sell to the U.S. will seek alternatives to China to source production. Taiwan and Thailand are already marketing themselves as alternatives.

Yet, moving a supply chain out of China is harder than it sounds. Mr. Kroeber notes in an interview that China doesn’t offer just low labor costs, it also has well-developed infrastructure and logistics, skilled labor such as engineers, and access to China’s own huge internal market. “That can’t be matched somewhere else.” Multinationals may need two supply chains: one with access to the U.S., and one with access to China. They would then have to decide whether their U.S.-centric or China-centric supply chain serves the rest of the world. (…)

Yet over time, China could overcome those disadvantages. It “has all the necessary prerequisites to make an Asian-based trading bloc work without the U.S.: a large domestic market, political support for open markets and manufacturing expertise,” writes Larry Brainard of TS Lombard, an investment advisory. China already does more trade in manufactured and intermediate goods with the European Union than the U.S., and twice as much with the rest of Asia, he notes. (…)

How China Pries Technology From U.S. Companies Beijing is increasingly leaning on levers to extract intellectual property—sometimes coercively—say U.S. companies. China says it’s payment for market access.

(…) China’s tactics, these interviews and documents show, include pressuring U.S. partners in joint ventures to relinquish technology, using local courts to invalidate American firms’ patents and licensing arrangements, dispatching antitrust and other investigators, and filling regulatory panels with experts who may pass trade secrets to Chinese competitors. (…)

At a January U.S. Chamber of Commerce dinner in Washington, executives pressed U.S. Ambassador to China Terry Branstad not to hit Beijing too hard on technology issues,according to dinner attendees. China has many ways to get even, warned Christopher Padilla, a vice president of International Business Machines Corp. , which licenses technology to Chinese firms. (…)

About one in five members of the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai say they have been pressured to transfer technology, according to a survey conducted in the spring. Of those companies, 44% in aerospace and 41% in chemicals report “notable pressure.” China considers both industries strategically important. (…)

Advanced Micro Devices Inc., a Silicon Valley chip company, entered a joint venture in 2016 with Chinese private and state-owned entities, including the government’s Chinese Academy of Sciences. AMD licenses microprocessor technology to the venture and is developing new computer chips with it.

AMD has received about $140 million in licensing through 2017, enough to help boost it into the black last year for the first time since 2011. “We created a joint venture that was very much a win-win,” AMD Chief Executive Lisa Su said at a 2016 conference. An AMD spokesman says the joint venture is “part of our strategy to create a complementary product offering.” (…)

Regulatory panels, packed with industry experts, must approve many chemicals before they can be produced in China and require detailed information on formulas and production processes, say U.S. trade groups and chemical firms. “Enough information to duplicate the product,” is how the American Chemical Council trade group put it in a filing to the U.S. government. (…)

China business schools evolving rapidly The shift from sending students overseas to offering MBAs at home is speeding up
Trump Accuses China of Trying to Interfere in U.S. Elections
White House to Raise Pressure on Canada With Mexico-Only Nafta Draft
Trump Seeks International Support on Iran, but Finds Little

Japan dodges U.S. auto tariffs, for now, as Trump and Abe agree on trade talks

(…) Of the 3.2 million vehicles sold this year in Japan, only 0.3 percent were American brands, according to data from Japan’s auto industry associations. In contrast, Japanese brands have a market share of about 40 percent in the U.S. (…)

While the U.S. currently has a 2.5 percent import tariff on passenger cars and 25 percent on trucks, Japan removed its last levies on auto imports almost four decades ago. Japan has long argued the reason for low presence of U.S. cars has nothing to do with tariffs: Japanese consumers generally perceive U.S. cars as bulky and inefficient — minicars and other locally made fuel-saving models dominate the country’s vehicle sales. (…)

Ford CEO says Trump’s metal tariffs cost automaker $1-billion

Steel and aluminum tariffs imposed by the Trump administration have cost Ford Motor Co about $1-billion in profits, its chief executive officer said on Wednesday, while Honda Motor Co said higher steel prices have brought “hundreds of millions of dollars” in new costs.

“From Ford’s perspective the metals tariffs took about $1-billion in profit from us,” CEO James Hackett said at a Bloomberg conference in New York, “The irony of which is we source most of that in the U.S. today anyway. If it goes on any longer, it will do more damage.” (…)

Honda has not boosted U.S. vehicle prices as a result of the higher costs but the issue is “certainly part of our thinking as we go forward,” Schostek told reporters after the hearing. (…)

IHS Markit estimates that full implementation of the 232 tariffs would add between $1,800 and $5,700 to a new vehicle’s price tag and cut new auto sales by around 2.2 million units in 2020 as well as slice total sales to as little as 14.5 million units from expectations of 17 million vehicles this year.

The new tariffs would also cost around 300,000 in auto-related jobs in factories and dealerships across the country, and slash U.S. economic growth by 1.1 percentage points to 2.2 per cent, IHS said. (…)

Oil Gains After U.S. Holds Fire on Opening Reserves Oil prices climbed, maintaining four-year highs, after the U.S. indicated it wouldn’t open up its strategic petroleum reserves to flood the market and put a cap on prices.
Large Investors Dive Into Risky Loan Securities Canada’s government pension plan is investing $285 million in the riskiest securities of collateralized loan obligations, as large institutions start funneling more cash into a market that has received record sums in 2018.

(…) CLOs raise money by issuing bonds and equity to outside investors and use the cash to buy bundles of below-investment-grade, or “leveraged,” corporate loans. The money coming in from the bundled loans pays investors’ interest and principal on the CLO bonds, in a process similar to mortgage-backed securitizations. Equity holders typically must cover loan losses above a certain threshold—an arrangement that accounts both for CLO equity’s risk and for its higher expected returns.

CLO equity has historically been purchased by hedge funds or private-equity firms. Purchases by large institutions such as CPPIB, with $275 billion in assets, could give CLO managers significantly more firepower to launch new deals, further boosting demand for leveraged loans and potentially adding to risk in junk debt markets. Managers can borrow about $9 million of bonds for each $1 million of equity raised to buy up leveraged loan pools. (…)

Purchases by CLOs helped push the leveraged-loan market to $1.22 trillion in June, exceeding the size of the junk bond market for the first time in 10 years.

The global CLO market has grown 25% in the past two years to about $700 billion outstanding, according to data from JPMorgan Chase & Co. Annual returns from the equity have averaged about 18% since 2004, according to research from JPMorgan, but some analysts caution that if leveraged loan defaults rise, certain CLOs will only have enough cash to keep paying their bonds, leaving equity holders with losses.

Institutional investors routinely purchased CLO bonds in recent years because they pay floating-rate interest—an advantage when interest rates are rising—and have outperformed more conventional corporate debt. (…)

Pointing up Howard Marks’ latest letter is a must read.

EARNINGS WATCH

The earnings season officially begins Oct. 12 but 12 S&P 500 companies have already reported and Zacks says that while “it is premature to draw any conclusions from the results thus far, but they are nevertheless on the weaker side relative to what we had seen from the same group of 12 index members in other recent periods.”

America’s High-Stake Midterm Elections

The stakes in the upcoming congressional midterm elections (November 6) are particularly high. The Republicans currently control both the House and the Senate. Not only would the loss of one or both chambers of Congress bring Trump’s agenda to a skidding halt, it could even signal the beginning of impeachment proceedings against him.

The 2018 midterms can also be divided into two separate elections. The Democrats are favoured to regain control of the House on account of Republican vulnerability in numerous suburban areas, whereas the Republicans look set to retain control of the Senate as the outcome there hinges more on rural states where Trump still has strong support. In all, 435 seats in the House of Representatives and 35 of the 100 seats in the Senate will be up for grabs in November 2018.

Historically, the incumbent president’s party has not fared well in midterm elections. It has lost seats in the House in 9 of the last 10 elections held halfway through the president’s first term. In the Senate, it has managed somewhat better. The sitting president’s party has given up seats in only 6 of those 10 elections. Historically, supporters of the party not in power have tended to be more motivated to show up at the polls. (…)

Historically, the relatively low voter turnout in the midterms has favoured the Republicans. This is because younger people, who make up a large part of the Democratic base, tend to vote at lower levels than do older white voters, who tend to favour the Republicans. In 2014, voter participation in the midterms was 37% compared with 55% in the last presidential election.

The Democrats are hoping that disapproval of President Trump will motivate millennial voters and other Democratic supporters to show up at the polls in greater numbers. So far, based on the total number of votes cast in the primaries (where candidates are selected for the general election), the Democratic base appears far more enthusiastic about voting than their Republican counterparts do. (…)

However, the apparent greater voter enthusiasm of the Democratic base is at least partially counteracted by two factors working in the Republicans’ favour. 1) The tendency for Democrats to win with overwhelming margins in heavily Democratic urban areas, thus wasting votes; and 2) gerrymandering, which is the process whereby state governors redraw the boundaries of legislative districts to favour their party, essentially by moving likely non-supporters to districts lost in advance. In order to overcome these barriers and have a chance of regaining control of the House of Representatives, Democrats would have to win the congressional popular vote by at least 7 percentage points. As the following chart illustrates, they are currently just above this threshold in the polls. (…) (NBF)

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Democrats’ enthusiasm to blunt Trump soars for congressional election: Reuters/Ipsos poll

(…) Across almost all demographic groups, more Democrats say they are certain to vote compared to poll results in 2014, the last non-presidential election year.

The Reuters/Ipsos poll has been tracking Americans’ interest in voting since 2010 and the polling on voter enthusiasm is built on data spanning 2014 to 2018, including data not readily available elsewhere. (…)

Even among groups often thought to favor U.S. President Donald Trump, a Republican, like whites without a college degree and avid church goers, those who identify as Democrats are more interested in voting this year, while Republicans are not. (…)

Enthusiasm is everything in the congressional elections, when turnout is typically lower than when the White House is also up for grabs. Only about four in 10 voting-age Americans bother to cast ballots compared to about six in 10 when it is.

When voters in one party are especially determined to be heard in a congressional election, it can swing control of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate. (…)

FiveThirtyEight forecasts that Democrats have 80.4% chance to take control of the House. The Senate odds are only 32% in favour of Democrats.

THE DAILY EDGE (25 September 2018):

Trump Pursues Trade Deals in Asia, Europe Amid Frostiness With China The White House is taking steps to show it wants to preserve and expand trade—albeit on its own terms

President Trump signed a revised free-trade pact on Monday with South Korea, as he steps up efforts this week to show he can strike new market-opening deals and isn’t antagonistic to trade. Mr. Trump also hopes by Wednesday to persuade Japan to enter formal bilateral trade talks, part of a commercial diplomacy effort this week by the president and his advisers on the sidelines of United Nations meetings in New York. (…)

This week’s efforts also coincide with what appears to be a rough patch in Mr. Trump’s efforts to rewrite the North American Free Trade Agreement. The administration has been pushing Canada to join by Sept. 30 a new Nafta framework set last month between the U.S. and Mexico. But talks with Ottawa broke down last week with no resolution on a number of sticking points. No new high-level negotiations were scheduled as of Monday afternoon. (…)

“The changes made are meaningful but modest,” said Wendy Cutler, who negotiated the original U.S.-Korea deal, known as Korus, under Presidents Bush and Obama. “The president set very high expectations that this was a terrible agreement and he was going to totally change it and reduce the bilateral trade deficit, but this seems to be pretty traditional agreement,” she added. Ms. Cutler also noted that “Korea came in with its own demands, and the U.S. was responsive—the U.S. gave as well as got.”

The biggest changes involve the auto industry. Seoul agreed to double the cap on the number of vehicles each U.S. automaker can sell annually in South Korea—from 25,000 to 50,000—for cars that meet U.S. safety rules, not Korean ones. And it agreed to let the U.S. keep in place until 2041 a 25% tariff on light trucks. Under the original deal, that was slated to be phased out over the next three years.

Both of those changes will have little immediate impact. None of the Big Three U.S. automakers had filled even half their quotas last year, and combined they exported just over 20,000 units to South Korea. Korean automakers currently don’t sell pick-up trucks in the U.S. Hyundai Motor Co. has announced plans to start selling a pick-up in the American market, but hasn’t said if it would be manufactured in South Korea, at its Alabama factory, or elsewhere in North America.

Despite Monday’s signing ceremony between Mr. Trump and Mr. Moon, it remains unclear when the pact will actually take effect. While the deal doesn’t need congressional ratification in the U.S., it does require legislative approval in South Korea. Korean lawmakers have warned that they won’t sign off without assurances that their automakers would be spared new restrictions in the event Mr. Trump follows through on a threat to impose global auto tariffs in the name of national security. That guarantee isn’t part of the pact signed on Monday. (…)

Japanese officials are hoping to emerge with an arrangement along the lines of the one that Mr. Trump reached at the White House in July with European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker—a joint statement that was broad in its goals of lowering trade barriers between the two sides, but vague on specific goals and timetables. That was sufficient for Mr. Trump to promise to avoid imposing car tariffs on European automakers as long as negotiations were ongoing.

The European talks fall far short of a wide-ranging free-trade agreement, and are currently focused on modest measures like cooperating on regulatory standards. An official free-trade agreement sets rules governing virtually all commerce between two countries. By contrast, the U.S.-Europe talks just touch on select specific sectors and practices.

Mr. Abe wants to avoid opening the door to a full-fledged U.S.-Japan free-trade-pact because he fears it would undermine his efforts to foster the advance of an Asian regional trade bloc. He succeeded in getting the remaining 11 TPP countries to stick together even after Mr. Trump’s withdrawal, and member legislatures are currently in the midst of ratifying the plan. (…)

BTW:

The immediate impact of the 10% tariff rate imposed by the US will be limited, since the depreciation of the Chinese yuan against the USD since February 2018 has largely offset the effect of the tariff on Chinese exporters. The Chinese yuan has depreciated from 6.27 against the USD on 8th February 2018 to 6.87 on 17th September 2018, which has shielded Chinese exporters almost entirely from the impact of the 10% tariff. (…)

However, if no US-China trade deal can be reached by the end of 2018, and the US tariff rate escalates to 25% on this second tranche of USD 200 billion of Chinese products, the impact on China’s export sector will be far more significant. (…)

A 25% tariff rate on USD 200 billion of Chinese products would also cause significant collateral damage to other Asian economies that are part of the East Asian manufacturing supply chain. Around one-third of the value added in Chinese exports consists of imported foreign raw materials and intermediate goods, much of which is sourced from East Asian economies.

However, there will also be some trade diversion effects away from China which may benefit some Asian exporting nations such as Vietnam and Malaysia. Vietnam produces low-cost electrical and electronic goods as well as garments and textiles that US importers could source as substitutes for some Chinese products, while Malaysia is a significant exporter of electrical and electronic goods globally. (…)

Rising US tariffs on Chinese products could significantly improve the relative competitiveness of several ASEAN countries as manufacturing hubs compared with China, notably for Vietnam, which is likely to be a significant winner from the US-China trade war. (Markit)

So many tweets, so few real changes…Bully deadlines to Canada simply come and go.  And now, the U.S. and China are not even talking…This is not a real estate game. It increasingly looks like a big messy hole from which Trump, and the USA,  need help to “graciously” emerge from.

Everything Looked Great for the Dollar Recently, So Why Didn’t It Go Up? The greenback has been weakening for the past month despite fundamentals; the preceding months hold clues as to why

(…) There are still a lot of hedge funds betting on a rising dollar, according to Commodity Futures Trading Commission data on futures positions, suggesting plenty of positions to be unwound if global sentiment keeps improving. On the other hand, U.S. short-term fundamentals are looking great for the dollar, with domestic economic data less disappointing than it had been, and more disappointing in Europe. That ever widening gap in yields in favor of the greenback should make dollars attractive, too. Fundamentals are likely to reassert themselves eventually, but sentiment has the momentum for now.

I often wish investors and pundits could be like our 3-year old grandson. When asked something on which he just has no clue, Linus simply and honestly says “I don’t know”.

This I know however: the recent dollar strength has actually been pretty tame and the USD remains in what could be a long-term downtrend in spite of everything suggesting it should totally outperform. (Chart from JP Morgan)

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BTW, a strong dollar may not be what the world needs at this time as William White, former BIS chief economist, writes (via John Mauldin):

(…) grounds for believing that a sharply stronger dollar could be troublesome do exist. BIS statistics indicate that, between end 2007 and 2017, dollar denominated debt issued by non-US-residents (non-banks) rose to $11.4 trillion, with emerging market debt doubling to $3.6 trillion. Moreover, these figures do not include off-balance-sheet borrowing through FX swaps which is probably even greater. The primary worry is that a stronger dollar would make such loans harder to service, leading in turn to concerns over the solvency of borrowers and then of lenders worldwide. (…)

New developments in financial markets have also, historically, been a source of contagion. The combination of large scale bond sales by emerging market corporates and purchases by asset management companies constitute just such a development. To these concerns about “known unknowns”, we must add worries about “known knowns” indicating poorly functioning markets. We have recently observed continuing market anomalies (e.g. violation of covered interest parity), flash crashes, bouts of reduced market liquidity, more indexing and passive investing, and the continued reliance of banks in many countries on wholesale dollar funding. Given that there could also be “unknown unknowns”, a repeat of 2008 market conditions cannot be ruled out.

The scramble for dollars in 2008 and after, particularly by European banks, was materially eased by swap lines between the Federal Reserve and the central banks of major, advanced economies. The continued adequacy of such measures is questionable. No such lines have been negotiated with emerging market countries, likely the first to be attacked. Further, the Dodd-Frank Act now constrains the Fed’s flexibility as Lender-of-Last Resort, even for American banks. Finally, would Congress and the Trump administration willingly accept lending trillions of dollars to unreliable foreigners in an “America first” world? Since the funding difficulties of banks could lead to insolvency, and since preparations for such events also remain inadequate, a global dollar shortage could yet prove a very serious problem.

My own, very humble, contribution to the not-so-strong USD: world trade is slow and slowing. Since 80% of global trade is in USD, fundamental demand for the greenback cannot be all that strong.

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Having struck a near seven-year high of 54.1 in January, the Global PMI Export Orders Index reading was a mere 50.3 in August, highlighting the rapid erosion of trade growth since the start of the year to near-stagnation.

Slower export growth has been commonly attributed by PMI respondents to rising concerns regarding tariffs and trade wars. Stagnant or falling exports are currently being recorded in the US, China, Japan and the UK, with only modest growth seen in the Eurozone.

The impact of tariffs on prices and worsening supply availability is also becoming apparent. Average prices charged for goods and services rose globally at the fastest rate since the global financial crisis in July, according to the PMIs, easing only modestly in August.

Tariffs and trade wars were also commonly cited as factors encouraging companies to build safety stocks of inputs to ensure supply, or lock-in lower prices, exacerbating supply shortages and driving prices even higher. The problem appears to be particularly acute in the US, where almost two thirds (64%) of US companies reporting higher input prices in August explicitly blamed tariffs as the cause of increase costs. Almost one-in-three went on to cite tariffs as the cause of having to hike prices to customers. (Markit)

The correlation between export orders and global GDP is obvious.

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ECB’s Draghi Says Rising Wages, Inflation Back Easy-Money Phaseout
MORE ON ONGOING MARGINS SQUEEZE

Following up on yesterday’s post and supporting the idea that margins are getting squeezed:

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MORE ON SMALL CAPS WARNING

Following up on yesterday’s post and supporting the idea that small caps are peaking out:

(…) When compared to their long-run trend, the relative returns of small caps reached nearly two standard deviations above their trend in August. Such an extreme level has been a reliable signal of a peak in the outperformance of small caps since 2001. The chart below also highlights a strong correlation between the relative performance of small-cap stocks and that of cyclical versus non-cyclical sectors, as both are sensitive to fluctuations in the macroeconomic cycle. Cyclicals have underperformed defensives since mid-June. (…) (Thomson Reuters)

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This is where we are on Value vs Cyclicals courtesy of Morgan Stanley. It rarely gets much worse…

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CEOs’ Economic Outlook Eases on Trade Policy Uncertainty

The Business Roundtable CEO Economic Outlook Index, which measures company plans for capital investment, hiring and sales, declined to 109.3 from 111.1 in the second quarter. While the third-quarter outlook index still clocked in at the fifth-highest level in the survey’s 16-year history—a signal of strong executive sentiment—business leaders expressed concern over trade policies. (…)

Close to two-thirds of surveyed CEOs said recently enacted tariffs and pending trade policies will have a “moderate or significant negative effect” on their capital spending decisions in the coming months.

In the third quarter, the share of firms planning to increase capital investment over the next six months decreased to 55% from 61% in the second quarter, while the share planning to expand hiring fell to 56% from 58%. (…)

“Decreases in capital investment not only impact the operations of Business Roundtable companies, less spending on equipment and facilities also squeezes small- and medium-sized suppliers and the millions of Americans they employ,” Mr. Bolten said in a statement. (…)

Report Says Tech’s Business Model Is Broken, Calls for Tighter Regulation Silicon Valley tech giants can’t be trusted to police themselves and should be subject to tougher regulation, according to a critical new report.

The business models powering digital advertising platforms like Facebook Inc. and Alphabet Inc.’s Google still undermine user privacy and incentivize disinformation campaigns despite recent efforts by tech companies to prevent abuse, says the report from Harvard’s Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy and New America, a left-leaning Washington-based think tank.

“We need to completely reorganize the way that industry works,” said Dipayan Ghosh, who previously worked on privacy and policy issues at Facebook and is now a fellow at the Shorenstein Center. (…)

Mr. Ghosh and his co-author, Ben Scott, a director of policy and advocacy at the Omidyar Network, argue that protecting user data will require a combination of stronger privacy laws and limits on how much data the tech companies can gobble up. They add that tech companies also need to provide additional disclosure about how their information is used to serve them ads, far beyond what is currently shared. (…)

Pointing up Among the specific recommendations is for tougher restrictions on tech-related mergers and acquisitions, particularly on those that allow the biggest companies to add to their vast stores of data about consumers. “If data is a source of primary value in the modern economy, then it should be a significant focus of merger review,” the authors write.

They also call for more aggressive third-party auditing of algorithms underpinning these systems.

Auto When the Supply of Uber and Lyft Drivers Rises, Their Earnings Fall  Average driver income fell by nearly half from late 2013 to this spring.