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THE DAILY EDGE: 24 SEPTEMBER 2021

U.S. Flash PMI: Private sector output growth hampered by severe supply chain hold-ups and capacity shortages

Private sector firms in the U.S. signalled a solid expansion in output during September, albeit at the slowest pace for a year and one that was much softer than that seen at the start of the summer. The overall upturn was weighed on by the weakest increase in service sector business activity in the current 14-month sequence of growth.

Adjusted for seasonal factors, the IHS Markit Flash U.S. Composite PMI Output Index posted 54.5 in September, down from 55.4 in August and much lower than May’s record high. The rate of output growth was the softest since September 2020, amid a notable slowdown in the pace of expansion in service sector activity compared to earlier in the year.

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At the same time, new order growth eased to the slowest since August 2020. Although demand conditions at manufacturing firms remained very strong by historical standards, the upturn in service sector new business slowed to a 14-month low as COVID-19 concerns persisted. While new export orders increased at a faster pace, the improvement was confined to manufacturing. Service providers registered a solid decline in exports as ongoing virus restrictions continued to impede activity.

Challenges finding suitable candidates and difficulties retaining employees were reflected in firms reporting only a fractional rise in employment for a second month. Backlogs of work rose strongly due to the resulting pressure on operating capacity. The rise in outstanding business was the second-fastest in over 12 years of data collection, with a record increase seen in manufacturing.

On the price front, input costs rose at a sharper pace during September. The rate of cost inflation was the quickest for four months, and the second-highest on record, as supply chain disruptions and material shortages pushed prices and transportation costs up. Meanwhile, output charges continued to increase markedly, continuing to rise at a pace far outstripping anything seen in the survey’s history prior to May, as firms sought to pass on higher costs to clients where possible.

Optimism at private sector firms was robust in September. Business confidence was often linked to hopes of improved client demand and the removal of supply chain blockages.

The seasonally adjusted IHS Markit Flash U.S. Services PMI™ Business Activity Index registered 54.4 in September, down from 55.1 in August, to signal a solid but slower rise in business activity across the service sector. The upturn in output was the softest in the current 14-month sequence of expansion and slowed once again from May’s recent high.

Contributing to the softer increase in activity was a slower rise in new business. Though solid, the rate of growth slowed for the fourth month running amid less robust demand conditions and ongoing COVID-19 worries. Total sales were also hampered by a quicker decline in new export orders, and one that was the fastest since December 2020.

Employment levels were broadly unchanged during September, bringing an end to a 14-month sequence of job creation. Capacity pressures led to a solid rise in outstanding business. Although quicker than the series trend pace, the rate of accumulation was the least marked for four months.

Cost pressures remained historically elevated, as greater supplier prices and increased wage bills following incentives to entice workers pushed costs up. Firms sought to pass on higher prices to their clients through a marked rise in output charges.

Meanwhile, the degree of optimism reached a three-month high amid hopes of stronger client demand and an end to the pandemic.

The health of the manufacturing sector improved substantially in September, as highlighted by the IHS Markit Flash U.S. Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI™) posting 60.5 at the end of the third quarter, down slightly from 61.1 in August. Although the pace of improvement in operating conditions was the slowest for five months, it was marked overall.

Supporting the overall upturn was a robust increase in new business. New orders were reportedly driven by strong demand conditions. At the same time, new export orders rose solidly and at the fastest pace for four months.

That said, supply constraints and material shortages dampened output in September. Although strong, the rate of expansion in production was the slowest for 11 months. Lead times lengthened substantially as trucking issues and capacity shortages led to one of the greatest deteriorations in vendor performance on record.

Manufacturers expanded their workforce numbers at a steeper rate in September. Despite many firms noting challenges finding suitable candidates and retaining current employees, many were able to hire additional workers, often offering greater wages to entice staff.

Goods producers registered another significant rise in input costs, albeit slightly slower than August’s recent high. Soaring material prices led to one of the fastest increases on record. As a result, the rate of selling price inflation accelerated to the sharpest since data collection began in May 2007 as firms passed higher costs on to their clients.

Hopes of greater availability of materials and staff over the coming months, alongside stronger demand conditions, reportedly supported optimism at manufacturers. The degree of confidence slipped to a four-month low, however.

This is really a Delta (services) and supply-chain slowdown, not a dangerous demand weakness:

  • U.S. manufacturers are seeing a “robust increase in new business” driven by “strong demand conditions” and “solid new export orders”.
  • Service providers continued to see a “solid” rise in new domestic business.
  • In the Eurozone, “inflows of new orders rose at the slowest pace since April” but that was after exceptionally strong gains seen in prior months.”

The key remains the American consumer. August retail sales were good with control sales up 2.6% after -2.0% and +1.6% in the previous two months. Last 3 months: +9.1% annualized.

Per Chase’s spending tracker, September sales look solid through Sept. 18.

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Chase’s control sales tracker is flat at a high level so far in September:

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Only Travel and Entertainment spending has materially weakened:

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That said, Markit’s flash PMI survey suggests weak employment growth in September and broad inflation pressures…

Perhaps offsetting:

(…) despite all of this economic damage and ongoing scarring, today’s flow of funds data from the Federal Reserve shows that household wealth has surged $26tn since the end of 2019 and is in fact up $32.2tn since the low point in 1Q 2020.

Non-financial assets – primarily real estate, but it also includes things such as cars, jewellery and equipment – now totals $46.2tn versus $40tn at the end of 2019. Meanwhile financial assets total $113.1tn, up from $93.4tn in 2019 – an astonishing 21% increase in 18 months.

The largest categories here are pension entitlements ($31tn), corporate equities ($30.5tn), small business equity ($13.7tn), mutual funds ($12.3tn) and time and savings deposits ($10.6tn).

Household Liabilities are “just” $17.7tn and are primarily mortgage and consumer loans, which leaves household net worth at $141.7tn. This is equivalent to 624% of US GDP and 786% of annual disposable income. As the chart below shows, the household balance sheet, in aggregate, has never been in as strong a position.

Household balance sheets have never been strongerunnamed - 2021-09-24T080612.204

Change in US household wealth versus 4Q 2019 (USD tn)unnamed - 2021-09-24T080657.069

It is undoubtedly the fact that the majority of the increases in wealth will have been experienced by higher income and already wealthy households since they will have been heavily invested in the “winning” asset classes. The biggest contribution to the financial wealth gains came from corporate equities and mutual funds due primarily to risk appetite rebounding and equity markets surging higher on unprecedented Federal Reserve and government stimulus. The same reasons led to strong performances for pension and life insurance funds. Conversely, the value of debt security holdings has actually fallen.

Lower income households will also have benefited to some extent with government stimulus checks of $1200, $600 and $1400 combined with uprated and extended unemployment benefits contributed to huge increases in household incomes over the past 14 months. This can be seen in the chart below with the orange bars representing the income boost from the checks and the grey bars representing the expanded unemployment benefits.

An NBER paper calculated that 69% of unemployment benefit recipients actually earned more money being unemployed than when they were working. The median recipient received 134% of their previous after-tax compensation. Encouragingly we are now seeing positive income growth from higher wages and salaries and this will hopefully mean that incomes can keep rising even as benefits are scaled back.

Change in annualised US household incomes versus February 2020 Source: Macrobond, ING

With employment growth looking resilient and higher income growth becoming increasingly evident the outlook for consumer spending remains positive. Today’s evidence of further massive accumulation of wealth only adds to the potential spending ammunition of the household sector. In an environment where supply constraints persist this adds another reason to argue that the demand growth in the economy is likely to outpace the supply side capacity. Another argument for inflation staying higher for longer and why the Fed will taper QE this year and start to raise interest rates from next year.

The Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) fell to 0.29 in August after rising to 0.75 in July (revised up from 0.53), according to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, suggesting a slower but still above-average growth.

The index’s three-month moving average (CFNAI-MA3), which smooths out the m/m volatility in the index, increased to 0.43 in August, a three-month high, from 0.36 in July. During the last 10 years, there has been 98% correlation between the level of the Chicago Fed Index and quarterly growth in real GDP.

The Production & Income index declined to 0.11 in August after rising to 0.40 in July. The Employment, Unemployment & Hours component decreased to 0.12, the lowest level since April, from 0.38. The Sales, Orders & Inventories reading slipped to 0.03, a three-month low, from 0.07. In contrast, the Personal Consumption & Housing index rebounded to 0.03, the highest level since March, from -0.09.

The CFNAI diffusion index, which measures the breadth of movement in the component series, eased to 0.30 in August from 0.34 in July. Forty-nine of the 85 component series contributed positively and 36 made negative contributions to the index overall.

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The Conference Board’s Composite Index of Leading Economic Indicators increased 0.9% m/m (10.0% y/y) in August following a slightly downwardly revised 0.8% m/m gain in July (initially 0.9%) and an upwardly revised 0.6% m/m rise in June (previously 0.5%). A 0.7% rise in August had been expected in the Action Economics Forecast Survey.

Nine of the 10 components contributed to the August increase with fewer unemployment claims, an increase in the ISM orders diffusion index and a rise in building permits making the three largest contributions. The drop in consumer expectations was the only component to subtract from the overall gain in August.

The Index of Coincident Economic Indicators increased 0.2% m/m (4.0% y/y) in August versus an unrevised 0.6% m/m gain in July and an upwardly revised 0.5% m/m increase in June (previously 0.4%). Each of the index’s four components contributed to the August, led by gains in nonagricultural employment and industrial production.

The Index of Lagging Indicators edged up 0.1% m/m (-1.1% y/y) in August following a downwardly revised 0.5% m/m gain in July (previously 0.6%). Three of the index’s seven components made positive contributions to the August gain, while three subtracted and one was neutral.

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Initial claims for unemployment insurance were 351,000 (-59.2% y/y) for the week ended September 18, up 16,000 from the prior week’s 335,000; that was revised from the 332,000 reported initially. The Action Economics Forecast Survey expected 320,000 initial filings in the latest week.

Initial claims for the federal Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) program in the week ended September 18 were 15,162, down from 23,037 the week before. The latest number was the lowest in the program’s history, which started April 4, 2020, at the beginning of the pandemic; for comparison, the three months through August averaged 101,555. The PUA program provided benefits to individuals who are not eligible for regular state unemployment insurance benefits, such as the self-employed. This program expired on September 6, likely explaining the very small number of new claims in the latest couple of weeks. Given the brief history of this program, these and other COVID-related series are not seasonally adjusted.

Continued weekly claims for regular state unemployment insurance rose in the September 11 week to 2.845 million (-77.6% y/y) from 2.714 million in the prior week, which was revised from 2.665 million. The associated rate of insured unemployment rose to 2.1% from 2.0%, which was revised from 1.9%.

Continued weekly claims in the PUA program fell to 4.896 million in the September 4 week (-59.0% y/y) from 5.487 million the week before. Continued weekly claims for Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation (PEUC) were 3.645 million in the September 4 week, down from 3.806 million. This program covers people who have exhausted their state unemployment insurance benefits.

In the week ended September 4, the total number of all state, federal, PUA and PEUC continued claims was 11.250 million, down 856,440 from the prior week. These total claims averaged 11.868 million over the four weeks ended September 4. These figures are not seasonally adjusted. (…)

Bespoke’s claims chart remains the best:

(Bespoke)

(…) Roughly speaking, inflation expectations are considered un-anchored when long-run inflation expectations change significantly in response to developments in inflation or other economic variables, and begin to move away from levels consistent with the central bank’s (implicit or explicit) inflation objective. In that case, actual inflation can become unmoored and risks drifting persistently away from the central bank’s objective. Well-anchored long-run inflation expectations therefore represent an important measure of the success of monetary policy. (…)

Taken together, these survey findings provide evidence that even though the current surge in inflation has affected short- and, to a lesser extent, medium-term inflation expectations, it did not significantly affect the anchoring of long-run inflation expectations.

Evergrande bondholders left in the dark as crucial deadline passes Indebted Chinese property developer faces imminent default on $84m offshore coupon payment

It’s still not clear if Evergrande will make the $83.5 million interest payment due yesterday. Three bondholders say so far they’ve received zilch.

(…) Bank of China (601988.SS), the country’s fourth largest lender by assets, is monitoring closely all its developer clients, to prevent contagion risks, said a person with knowledge of the matter.

“The expectation is that not only Evergrande, but also some of the top leveraged developers are on edge of liquidity crash even insolvency,” said a person at the Bank of Shanghai Co Ltd (601229.SS).

To calm the market and in an unusual move, Chinese lenders including China Minsheng Bank (600016.SS), China Zheshang Bank (2016.HK) and China Everbright Bank (601818.SS) have been publicly reassuring and voluntarily disclosing their exposure to Evergrande and the property sector.

But internally, financiers are scrambling to reduce their exposure to “non-quality property assets”, bracing for a sharp deterioration in the financial health of some developers. (…)

Chinese banks, insurers and bond funds have provided large scale funding to the property sector in recent years, and their exposure is among the more significant risks facing the financial system, Scope research said on Thursday.

Property loans accounted for nearly 30% of total outstanding loans of Chinese financial institutions at the end of September 2020, as per data from the People’s Bank of China.

Fitch Ratings said in a report on Friday that many of the smaller mid-tier Chinese banks are expected to face “greater asset-quality headwinds” as the property sector suffers an increase in the credit stresses that were highlighted by Evergrande.

China’s central bank said all cryptocurrency-related transactions are illegal, reinforcing the country’s tough stance against digital rivals to government issued money.

In a statement posted on its website on Friday afternoon, the People’s Bank of China said the latest notice was to further prevent the risks surrounding crypto trading and to maintain national security and social stability. (…)

It also said it is illegal for overseas exchanges to provide services for residents in China through the internet.

China banned cryptocurrency exchanges from operating within its borders several years ago, but individuals in the country have continued to find ways to trade bitcoin and other digital currencies via over-the-counter or peer-to-peer transactions.

In May this year, a powerful Chinese superregulator pledged to crack down on bitcoin trading and energy-intensive mining, helping to send the price of bitcoin tumbling. Financial regulators in the country have also gotten tougher on banks and payment companies and in June ordered them to take a more active role in weeding out crypto-related transactions.

The statement was dated Sept. 15 but it was only posted onto the central bank’s website at 5 p.m. local time on Friday.

THE DAILY EDGE: 23 SEPTEMBER 2021

China Prepares for Evergrande Demise Beijing, reluctant to bail out the country’s most heavily indebted property developer, is asking local officials across the country to prepare for a “possible storm.”

(…) The officials characterized the actions being ordered as “getting ready for the possible storm,” saying that local-level government agencies and state-owned enterprises have been instructed to step in only at the last minute should Evergrande fail to manage its affairs in an orderly fashion.

They said that local governments have been tasked with preventing unrest and mitigating the ripple effect on home buyers and the broader economy, for example by limiting job losses—scenarios that have grown in likelihood as Evergrande’s situation has worsened. (…)

Local governments have been ordered to assemble groups of accountants and legal experts to examine the finances around Evergrande’s operations in their respective regions, talk to local state-owned and private property developers to prepare to take over local real-estate projects and set up law-enforcement teams to monitor public anger and so-called “mass incidents,” a euphemism for protests, according to the people.

PBOC injects cash on Evergrande saga, seasonal spike in demand for cash

Nordea: How bad is the situation in Chinese Real Estate?

(…) Housing affordability is accordingly bad in China, with price-to-income ratios in extreme bubble territory (at least by Western standards). Price to income ratios in Beijing have exceeded 25, while also Shanghai looks stretched. The national average is also far above price-to-income ratios seen anywhere in the West, and while some of it may be explained away by either taxation differences or different development stages, we would still argue that these numbers are frightening from a fundamental perspective.

The subprime crisis in the US was “triggered” by median house price to income ratios of 7-8, which is even below the current national average in China. This means that a potential ugly latent crisis could unfold unless Chinese authorities manage to cage in Evergrande contagion risks. Other large developers such as Country Garden have substantially less gearing than Evergrande, but we would be surprised not to see intra-sector contagion to other smaller but geared Real Estate developers.

The big difference from China to the West is obviously that the Chinese authorities hold a much larger possibility of de facto controlling price developments, which is arguable THE reason why China sceptics have been wrongly calling for a bursting housing bubble for years already. Evergrande could the proof that authorities deliberately try to bring down leverage in the sector and accordingly also house prices in a contained way.

Housing affordability in China versus the West

It is therefore not out of this world to think of the following modus operandi in China over the coming weeks. Evergrande will not pay dues on international/offshore debt, which leaves bond/equity holders at high risk of being wiped out. The CCP will try to contain the domestic risks by “bailing out” local lenders and contractors by slowly but surely transferring Evergrandes assets to a quasi-public entity over the coming years. This will ensure that the local supply chain steers mostly clear of contagion as the publicly backed quasi-fund will ensure that contractors will get paid (albeit possibly with a delay and/or a palatable discount of 30-40%).

If we are right, all projects will likely be concluded and the roughly $150bn debt/risk on contractors/suppliers will be decently contained. As soon as the potential managed default is “known”, PBoC may start easing policy to contain the downside pressure on the rest of the economy. Expect both a rate cut and more cuts to the reserve requirements of commercial banks from October/November. This is likely to take USD/CNY higher (and EUR/USD lower) before New Year’s.

We expect the spill over effects on an already slowing housing market to be the largest contagion risk in an Evergrande restructuring / default scenario. Recent daily averages of sales volumes in Chinese Real Estate markets were already seasonally low before Evergrande turned into global breaking news, and we are clearly watching whether the volumes will rebound significantly post the moon festival.

China was already slowing clearly before Evergrande hit the wires, and this story will likely only emphasize the direction with further negative repercussions for global growth. This is likely to take the steam out of the cyclical part of the global economy, which may warrant asset allocation trend shifts away from cyclical assets (Global: How to position for a (clearly) weaker credit impulse?)

Goldman Sachs:

The median dots showed 0.5 hikes in 2022, 3 more hikes in 2023, and 3 more hikes in 2024, more hawkish than our expectation of 0, 2, and 3. But we see the overall message as a bit less hawkish, both because the split vote on a 2022 hike came alongside a high median core inflation forecast of 2.3% in 2022, and because our best guess is that Chair Powell’s own projections show 0 hikes in 2022, 2 in 2023, and 2 in 2024, a more dovish path than implied by the median.

Fed Tees Up Taper and Signals Rate Rises Possible Next Year Central bank officials prepare to reverse pandemic stimulus programs as soon as November; new projections showed half of 18 officials expect to raise interest rates by the end of 2022

(…) “The purpose of that language is to put notice out that that could come as soon as the next meeting,” Fed Chairman Jerome Powell said at a press conference.

Mr. Powell said officials hadn’t made a formal decision on how quickly to reduce purchases, but most agreed that a gradual process “that concludes around the middle of next year is likely to be appropriate.” (…)

To conclude those purchases by the middle of next year, officials could pare those holdings by $10 billion and $5 billion a month, respectively, if they begin the process next month. That would be a somewhat faster timetable—around eight months—than during a previous taper experience that was announced in late 2013 and lasted over 10 months in 2014.

“I think this will be a shorter period,” Mr. Powell said. “The economy’s much farther along than it was when we tapered in 2013.” (…)

For the labor-market goal, “I guess my own view would be that the test…is all but met,” said Mr. Powell, reinforcing the prospect that a taper would likely begin in November. (…)

“The test is all but met”:

  • Total employment is 5.3 million (3.5%) short of its Feb. 2020 level.
  • Employment has been increasing by 653k per month in the last 6 months, 750k in the last 3. At these rates, we are between 7 and 11 months from the Feb. 2020 level.
  • The unemployment rate is at 5.2% from 3.5% in Feb. 2020.
  • The participation rate is 61.7% and has not increased during the past 12 months. It was 63.3% in Feb. 2020.
  • The unemployment rate for African-Americans is 8.8% vs 6.0% in Feb. 2020.
  • The unemployment rate for “no college” is 6.0% vs 3.5% in Feb. 2020.

“It may just be that it’s going to take more time,” said Mr. Powell. “These are people who were largely working in February of 2020. They’ll get back to work…It may just take a longer time.” (…)

Looking ahead, FOMC participants project the labor market to continue to improve, with the median projection for the unemployment rate standing at 4.8 percent at the end of this year and 3.5 percent in 2023 and ’24.

At Powell’s presser, just so we’re all clear on what is “substantial progress” (my emphasis):

So the question is really on the maximum-employment test. So if you look at a good number of indicators, you will see that, since last December, when we articulated the test and the readings today, in many cases more than half of the distance, for example, between the unemployment rate in December of 2020 and typical estimates of the natural rate, 50 or 60 percent of that road has been traveled. So that could be substantial further progress.

So much for a data-dependent Fed…

BTW, last August 27, Powell said (my emphasis):

The unemployment rate has declined to 5.4 percent, a post-pandemic low, but is still much too high, and the reported rate understates the amount of labor market slack. Long-term unemployment remains elevated, and the recovery in labor force participation has lagged well behind the rest of the labor market, as it has in past recoveries. We have much ground to cover to reach maximum employment (…)

FYI: “Maximum employment is the highest level of employment or lowest level of unemployment that the economy can sustain while maintaining a stable inflation rate. Over the past few decades, experience has shown that it is possible to keep unemployment low and the jobs market strong without leading to an unwanted increase in inflation. In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that low unemployment can be sustained without leading to an unwanted increase in inflation.”

Grep Ip:

(…) Last September, long before the supply bottlenecks emerged, the median forecast by Fed officials was for core inflation (which excludes food and energy) in 2022 of 1.8%. Every few months since then they have nudged that up, and in the forecasts released Wednesday they see core inflation next year at 2.3%.

(…) next year’s projected 2.3% is the highest next-year core inflation forecast since projections were first published in 2007, according to Derek Tang of Monetary Policy Analytics. (…)

On Wednesday, the Fed signaled it would likely start tapering those bond purchases in November, which means the process would be over by mid-2022, clearing the way for a rate increase. Half of Fed officials think rates will start rising by late next year. Just last March, a majority of officials didn’t see that happening until 2024.

What changed? It isn’t because the economic outlook is stronger. In fact, officials now see slower growth and higher unemployment than they did in March. (…)

A 2.3% inflation rate isn’t a big deal. Indeed, it would conform pretty closely to the Fed’s new goal of letting inflation run above 2% for a while to compensate for the many years it ran below 2%. Yet if officials are wrong, they are likely to have proved too low in their forecasts. With unemployment expected to fall to 3.8% by next year and 3.5% by 2023, the economy will be operating with little or no spare capacity, conditions that typically cause inflation to rise.

Fed officials think inflation risks are to the upside; a majority said so Wednesday. Six of 18 Federal Open Market Committee participants think core inflation will be 2.5% or higher next year.

If the Fed is more worried about inflation, investors aren’t. Long-term bond yields dropped a bit Wednesday, and bond-implied future inflation rates haven’t changed much since May. The market might have more faith in the Fed’s “transitory” story than the Fed itself.

Or the Fed’s own activity is keeping bond-implied future inflation rates lower than Mr. Market would on its own…

More on inflation from Powell’s presser:

As the reopening continues, bottlenecks, hiring difficulties, and other constraints could again prove to be greater and longer-lasting than anticipated, posing upside risks to inflation.

(…) the bottlenecks and shortages that are being—that we’re seeing in the economy have really not begun to abate in a meaningful way yet.

So those seem to be going to be with us at least for a few more months and perhaps into next year. So that suggests that inflation is going to be higher this year and a number—you know, I guess, the inflation rates for next year and 2023 were also marked up but just by a couple of tenths.

Those are very modest overshoots. You’re looking at 2.2 and 2.1, you know, two years—two years and three years out. These are very, very—I don’t think that households are going to, you know, notice a couple of tenths of an overshoot. That just happens to be people’s forecasts.

But earlier in the same press conference, he referred to 2.3% inflation and the dot plot reveals the 6 of the 18 participants see inflation at 2.5%. BTW, last seen core CPI was 4.0% and core PCE 3.6%. But nobody really notices…

How about a new “transitory CPI”?

(…) With producers such as Exxon Mobil Corp. and Chevron Corp. under pressure from investors to minimize environmental damage, many are limiting spending on new output. The caution comes after years of declining investments in production that were driven by lackluster commodity prices and a focus on returning money to shareholders, analysts say. (…)

Even with prices for metals like copper also at their highest levels in years, annual spending by mining companies is projected to remain about 30% or more below a 2012 peak each of the next five years, according to data compiled by investment bank Jefferies. (…)

In recent weeks, aluminum has soared, buoyed by limits on how much power aluminum smelters in China can consume. (…)

One reason some investors are particularly bullish on metals like copper, aluminum and lithium—a key component of the rechargeable batteries that power electric cars—is that demand for these materials from green-energy projects is expected to surge even as environmental concerns limit supply. (…)

“Most of the limiting factors on supply are now related to environmental issues.”

Eurozone flash PMI points to slower growth as bottlenecks curb activity and input price gauge hits 21-year high

Eurozone business activity grew at a markedly reduced rate in September, reflecting the peaking of demand in the second quarter, supply chain bottlenecks and concerns over the ongoing pandemic. Business expectations for the coming year were also knocked by rising worries over the impact of the Delta variant on demand and supply chains, contributing to a further moderation in the rate of job creation from July’s 21-year peak.

Firms’ costs meanwhile rose at the fastest rate in 21 years as demand again outstripped supply, with price rises increasingly feeding through from manufacturing to services.

The headline IHS Markit Eurozone Composite PMI® fell sharply in September, dropping from 59.0 in August to 56.1 to indicate a further cooling of the rate of expansion from July’s 15-year high, according to the ‘flash’ reading*. The latest increase in business activity was the smallest since April, albeit still well above the survey’s pre-pandemic long-run trend to signal another month of above-average strong growth.

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Robust but slowing growth was recorded across both manufacturing and services, with the latter outperforming modestly. Whereas the service sector merely saw growth slip to the weakest since May, manufacturers reported the smallest production gain since January.

Slower production growth in manufacturing was primarily linked to supply chain constraints, which also affected some service providers. The ongoing pandemic was meanwhile again also often widely blamed for subdued demand growth, notably in curbing service sector exports.

Measured overall, inflows of new orders rose at the slowest pace since April, with demand growing at reduced rates in both manufacturing and services after exceptionally strong gains seen in prior months.

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New export order growth likewise waned, dropping to the lowest since February. The pace of expansion cooled sharply in manufacturing, while new business from abroad increased only modestly in services.

Backlogs of uncompleted orders meanwhile rose sharply again, most notably in manufacturing, commonly reflecting supply constraints.

Suppliers’ delivery times, a key gauge of supply chain delays in the manufacturing sector, lengthened at an increased rate in September, continuing to extend to a degree greatly exceeding anything seen prior to the pandemic.

Shortages once again fed through to a steep rise in firms’ input costs. Across manufacturing and services, input costs rose at the sharpest rate since September 2000. Service sector input cost inflation hit the highest since July 2008 while input price inflation in manufacturing remained close to all-time highs.

Higher costs were commonly passed on to customers. Measured overall, selling price inflation accelerated in September, rising to the third-highest rate seen over the past two decades, exceeded only by the increases seen in June and July.

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Employment growth meanwhile slipped to a four-month low, moderating in both manufacturing and services amid some concerns over the resilience of future demand and supply, yet remained historically strong – among the highest seen over the past two decades – as companies continued to rebuild or expand capacity.

Similarly, future sentiment moderated for a third month running to the lowest since January, linked to concerns over the ongoing pandemic, notably in the service sector.

Within the eurozone, growth slowed especially sharply in Germany, down to its lowest since February, with marked coolings seen in both manufacturing and services, the former in particular hit by supply constraints.

Growth also moderated in France, slipping further from June’s peak to the lowest since April. The service sector showed more resilience than manufacturing, the latter seeing output increase only modestly as shortages continued to bite.

Growth in the rest of the eurozone as a whole outpaced that seen in Germany and France, though eased to the slowest since April, led by a softer services expansion and some waning of growth in manufacturing.

U.S. Existing Home Sales Fell in August

The National Association of Realtors (NAR) reported that sales of existing homes fell 2.0% m/m (-1.5% y/y) in August to 5.880 million units at an annual rate. The 5.990 million sales pace initially reported for July was revised up to 6.000 million. The Action Economics Forecast Survey expected sales of 5.870 million units in August. These data are compiled when existing home sales close.

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Sales fell in each major region in August. Sales in the Northeast declined 1.4% m/m (-2.7% y/y) to 730,000 units. Midwest sales also fell 1.4% m/m (-2.1% y/y) in August to 1.370 million units, the first monthly decline in five months. Sales in the South decreased 3.0% m/m (-0.8% y/y) to 2.550 million units. And sales in the West slipped 0.8% m/m (-1.6% y/y) to 1.230 million units.

The median price of an existing home edged down 0.8% m/m (+14.9% y/y) to $356,700 in August with the median sales price declining in each of the four major regions. This was the second consecutive monthly decline for the national figure. The monthly decline was largest in the Northeast (-0.83% m/m, +16.8% y/y)) and smallest in the West (-0.08%, +11.4% y/y)). The price data are not seasonally adjusted

The supply of houses for sale continued to be a restraint on sales. The number of existing homes on the market fell 1.5% m/m (NSA) in August to 1.290 million units and was 13.4% lower than a year ago. These figures date back to January 1999. The supply of homes on the market held at 2.6 months of the current sales pace, but remained well below its recent high of 4.6 months in May of last year and was marginally above it all-time low of 1.9 months reached last December.

Sales of existing single-family homes fell 1.9% m/m (-2.8% y/y) in August to 5.190 million units (SAAR) after rising 2.9% m/m in July. Sales of condos and co-ops fell 2.8% (+9.5% y/y) to 690,000.

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(CalculatedRisk)

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Data: The N.Y. Times. Chart: Kavya Beheraj/Axios