The enemy of knowledge is not ignorance, it’s the illusion of knowledge (Stephen Hawking)

It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so (Mark Twain)

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CAPE IMPROVED?

Much, much has been written lately about CAPE and whether or not it can be useful. Back in 2009-10, bears were using it to demonstrate the folly of getting back into equities. Today, because CAPE remains in dangerously high territory, bulls are dismissing it or are trying to find ways to explain why it has not worked in the past 5 years to justify leaving it in the cupboard. The last times I wrote on CAPE were in Nov. 2012 (The Shiller P/E: Alas, A Useless Friend) and in Feb. 2014 (“LEAVING CAPE TOWN”).

Jeff, a reader, sent me a link to yet another attempt at modifying CAPE to render it more useful. Tom McClellan, a technical analyst who publishes The McClellan Market Report wrote an article about a modified CAPE which was reproduced by Pragmatic Capitalism under the title A Scary Valuation Indicator. I am not a CAPE fan for reasons amply detailed in my above mentioned posts but this latest attempt got me working: rarely have I seen people incorporate historical interest rates in their P/E analysis, even though it is inherently part of the P/E DNA. Could this latest version be the one that would provide CAPE with its missing ingredient?

Tom McClellan explains the relationship in layman’s terms:

This is because the P/E ratio is the inverse of the “earnings yield”, which should reasonably match up with bond yields.  If an investor can get a better return on his money in the bond market, then he will flee the stock market, or vice versa. That is what keeps the earnings yield and bond yields in correlation.  But when investors are bidding up stock prices to a ridiculous point such that the earnings yield is way out of whack from the bond interest yield, then there can be a big problem.

The idea is that by dividing the actual CAPE multiple by the Moody’s Baa bond yield, one would get a P/E ratio adjusted for credit risks as embedded in the Baa yield. McClellan makes no serious attempt at fundamentally justifying the relationship, other than to see that

(…) the result seems to set a much more uniform ceiling for how high valuations can go.

CAPE ratio adjusted by Baa yield

Not bad. A CAPE ratio divided by Baa yields at or above 5 has indeed identified most market peaks. It missed the 2008 peak but maybe the high bar should be set at 4.5 rather than 5.0.

The buy signals are not so obvious however, and the usefulness of the ratio between 1970 and 1995 left a lot to be desired.

What McClellan fails to see is that the real interest in this modification of CAPE is in the indirect incorporation of inflation in the equity valuation approach, something missing in virtually all valuation methods other than the Rule of 20.

Absolute P/E ratios are of little usefulness in assessing equity valuations as this chart reveals. Simply knowing that P/E ratios tend to fluctuate between 10 and 20 is an important but still often useless information. (Click on charts to enlarge)

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Inflation is a crucial factor influencing earnings multiples. Saying P/E ratios are historically low or high without looking at inflation is like commenting on the weather looking through a window without knowing if it is cold or warm outside. Incomplete information may be hazardous to your physical or financial health.

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The Rule of 20 P/E is simply the sum of the actual P/E on trailing earnings and the inflation rate. The next chart shows the much more stable (read useful) pattern compared with the actual P/E. The Rule of 20 P/E fluctuated between 15 and 25 with very few exceptions over the past 60 years. For investors, the Rule of 20 P/E provides a vital reading of how current equity markets really compare with their historical valuation range, using only actual data. Why nobody cares about this extraordinary relationship while desperately trying to make use of the CAPE P/E keeps eluding me.

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Back to the Baa yields into CAPE. Below, I charted the modified CAPE with the Rule of 20 P/E (divided by 6 to have it on the same scale). The superiority of the Rule of 20 is obvious.

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Looking at the current valuation readings, the Rule of 20 P/E is sitting at the “20” level, the border between lower and higher risk markets. The modified CAPE, like the original, is at extreme valuation levels, where it has been for the last 2 years. In addition to the original CAPE flaws, the modified version incorporates its own flaw: in effect, we can easily argue that the current interest rate structure is significantly impacted by the various interventions by the Fed and the ECB in recent years. As such, Baa yields are arbitrarily low at the present time and do not reflect credit risks and/or inflation premium in a manner consistent with history.

To conclude, here’s the Rule of 20 Barometer since 1956 (se also Understanding The Rule Of 20 Equity Valuation Barometer). You should also take a look at THREE-STARRED EQUITIES

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NEW$ & VIEW$ (4 APRIL 2014)

March Nonfarm Payrolls: +192K vs. consensus +200K, +197K previous (revised from 175K).
U.S. Trade Gap Widens, Spurring Downshift in GDP Projections Fall in Exports Suggests Weak Overseas Economies Could Be Restraining U.S. Growth

The nation’s exports declined 1.1% to $190.43 billion, while imports rose 0.4% to $232.73 billion, the Commerce Department said Thursday. As a result, the nation’s trade gap widened 7.7% to $42.3 billion, more than the $38.6 billion gap forecast by economists. It was the largest trade deficit since September.

February’s export decline followed a 0.6% gain in January. That suggests the surge in overseas sales that helped boost economic growth late last year was likely unsustainable. Growth in China is slowing while Europe’s recovery remains fragile, tempering demand for U.S. exports. (…)

Macroeconomic Advisers lowered its first-quarter growth forecast to a 0.9% annual growth rate from 1.4% previously. Morgan Stanley lowered its forecast to a 1.2% pace from 1.5%. Economists at Royal Bank of Scotland lowered their forecast to a 0.6% annual growth rate from 1.2% previously. (…)

February’s meager import growth provided new evidence of weak spending by U.S. consumers and businesses in the early part of the year. Domestic demand looks even weaker after adjusting the import data for inflation. Stripping out the effect of higher prices for petroleum and other products, imports fell slightly. Imports of capital goods, industrial supplies and petroleum products all declined. Imports of crude oil fell to $19.5 billion, the lowest level since late 2010, a reflection of expanded domestic energy production. (…)

U.S. exports to the European Union in February were down 2.5% from January, while exports to China were 4.6% lower. (…)

Pointing up Note that U.S. exports had dropped 1.7% in December. Last 3 months: –2.2% or –9.1% annualized. Let’s hope Goldman is right:

GOLDMAN: The Global Economy Is No Longer Decelerating

GLI swirlogramGoldman Sachs analysts track a proprietary index used as a proxy for global growth called the “Global Leading Indicator,” or GLI. After a few months of deceleration, the GLI was unchanged in March.

“This ends six months of slowing and locates the global industrial cycle on the cusp of the ‘Expansion’ phase,” says a team of Goldman analysts led by George Cole in a note to the firm’s clients. The GLI is made up of 10 components, half of which improved last month, while the other half deteriorated.

“Korean exports improved and U.S. Initial Jobless Claims also trended lower. The Belgian and Netherlands Manufacturing Survey and the Baltic Dry Index showed some strength as well. On the negative side, the S&P GSCI Industrial Metals Index® continued to drop sharply, while the AUD & CAD TWI aggregate was only marginally lower. The Global PMI and the Global New Orders less Inventories (NOIN) aggregates were also softer (primarily on account of still soft EM activity) and the Japan Inventory/Sales ratio, while still at strong levels, deteriorated slightly.” (Tks Gary)

Earnings needed

About that European bull market. Enthusiasm is there, but the earnings not so much yet.

With little support from earnings, European equities continue to be re-rated in P/E and price/book terms. From 10x in late 2011 to 17x now, European equities trade above both post-1980 and post-1990 average P/Es.

Citi strategist Jonathan Stubbs finds that it’s not just the average, value stocks no longer offer great value either. So, look for places where corporate earnings are actually, y’know, growing.

The slightly strange thing about this bull market though is just how lackluster earnings growth has actually been. Note the transition from optimism to reality in each of the past three years – companies actually have to deliver in 2014.

Cheap ain’t never been this pricey (for the last 25 years at least when you look at the average valuation for the bottom quintile of European stocks on a forward price to earnings basis, yo).

In the U.S., the Q1 earnings season begins next week. Expect a lot of weather-related comments even though ChangeWave’s recent survey of 2,341 corporate respondents suggests that only a few biz were significantly impacted:

When we asked U.S. corporate respondents whether the recent severe weather has affected their business, 42% reported their company has been negatively impacted – 8% Significant Negative Effect and 34% Slight Negative Effect. Only 8% report a “general loss of sales/productivity”.

SENTIMENT WATCH
Moody’s: Tight Credit Spreads atop Extremely Low Yields Dispute Consensus on Rates

The current combination of exceptionally narrow bond yield spreads and extraordinarily low corporate bond yields betrays a good deal of investor confidence in a limited upside for Treasury bond yields. Such confidence is at odds with the consensus call for significantly higher Treasury yields.

Barclays Capital’s yield spread over US Treasuries for US investment grade (IG) industrial company bonds recently dipped to 105 bp, which was less than its 106 bp average of the four-years-ended June 2007. The return of the IG industrial bond spread to its lowest range of the previous economic recovery is extraordinary in view of how it occurred in the context of a 3.24% average for the IG industrial company bond yield. Apparently, corporate bond investors are confident that the spread’s recent benchmark Treasury yield of 2.12% will not soon soar to its 4.28% average of the four-years-ended June 2007.

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Thus, the corporate bond market is effectively very much at odds with the recent prediction by 10 members of the FOMC that the federal funds rate will be at least 4% over the longer run. Such a forecast seems bold given that the fed funds rate averaged a significantly lower 3.2% during the four-years-ended June 2007, which was the liveliest segment of an economic recovery that compares favorably with the current upturn. (…)

Thin Spreads Coexist with Record Low Yields in High-Yield Space

The US’s recent high yield bond spread of 350 bp shows an even more noticeable shortfall relative to its 365 bp average of the four-years-ended June 2007. Nevertheless, the latest high yield bond spread is still well above its lowest six-month average of that span, which was the 286 bp of 2007’s first half.

However, very thin spreads offer no assurance of a healthy credit market going forward. By 2008’s first half, the high yield spread had ballooned to 700 bp, and the rest is history. Razor thin credit spreads can warn of an excessive complacency toward default risk that practically begs for trouble. (Figure 3.)

Though the current outlook for defaults is benign, it is not favorable enough to warrant a high-yield spread of 350 bp, especially in the context of a subpar business cycle upturn that still might deliver deflationary surprises here and there. All of these qualifications beg the question as to why investors will accept such narrow high-yield bond spreads given the consensus view of significantly higher benchmark Treasury yields over the next 12 months. Again, the best answer to this conundrum is that the corporate bond market senses the continuation of a slack, uninspiring recovery that limits the upside for benchmark borrowing costs.

In other words, the corporate bond market’s focus is on business sales, whose sluggish growth betrays a lack of pricing power that will help to contain inflation and bond yields. By contrast, the Treasury bond market may be focusing too intently on jobs growth that because of the possibly diminished quality of new jobs and the reality of shorter hours now overstates the upside potential for consumer spending, household borrowing, and consumer price inflation.

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And this:image

And that:

Investors plowed $2.44 billion into emerging market equity funds in this latest week, the highest amount since October 2013, Barclays said, citing data from fund-tracker EPFR Global.

Meanwhile in emerging market bond funds, investors poured $1.06 billion in, compared with outflows of $1.11 billion in the previous week. (…)

After a tumultuous start to the year, emerging market assets have made a strong comeback in recent weeks, encouraging investors to return. Currencies such as the Indian rupee and Indonesia rupiah have hit multi-month highs against the dollar.

In stock markets, the MSCI emerging market index is up 4.6% in the past month.

The crisis in Ukraine has receded and relative weakness in U.S. data has meant U.S. Treasury yields haven’t risen as expected. That takes away a factor that caused a significant selloff in emerging markets in 2013. (…)