The enemy of knowledge is not ignorance, it’s the illusion of knowledge (Stephen Hawking)

It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so (Mark Twain)

Invest with smart knowledge and objective odds

THE DAILY EDGE: 24 MARCH 2022

FLASH PMIs

Eurozone growth slows, exports fall, business sentiment slumps and prices rise at record rate as Russia invades Ukraine

The headline S&P Global Eurozone Composite PMI® fell from 55.5 in February to 54.5 in March, according to the preliminary ‘flash’ estimate*. The decline indicates some loss of economic growth momentum from February’s five-month high but still signals the second-strongest expansion since last November. The rate of expansion also remained above the survey’s pre-pandemic long-run average.

image

While firms – notably in the service sector – continued to benefit from resurgent demand linked to the further reopening of the economy from COVID-19 containment measures, companies also reported that the Ukraine war and accompanying sanctions had led to weakened demand, rising uncertainty, higher costs and renewed supply chain issues.

Manufacturing output growth waned most sharply, dropping to the lowest since last October as new orders placed with eurozone factories rose at the joint-slowest pace since the recovery from the first pandemic lockdowns began in July 2020. New export orders for goods fell for the first time in 21 months. Auto makers were especially hard hit, with output back in decline, with chemicals and resources firms also near-stalled.

Business activity and new orders in the service sector also rose at reduced rates compared to February’s rebound, led by a renewed drop in service sector exports, though the overall expansions remained well above the long-run averages thanks principally to the easing of pandemic restrictions. March saw virus containment measures ease across the eurozone to the lowest since the pandemic began, boosting tourism and recreation activity.

A major impact of the war was evident on prices, with the invasion of Ukraine widely linked to a further rise in companies’ costs, exacerbating existing supply and demand imbalances and causing a surge in energy prices. Average input prices across both manufacturing and services rose at a rate far in excess of any previous increase recorded since comparable data were first available in 1998. The eurozone PMI input cost index reading of 81.6 compared to 74.8 in February and a prior peak of 76.0 seen back in November. A record increase for service sector input costs was accompanied by the steepest rise in manufacturing input costs since the near-record increases seen late last year.

The increase in raw material and energy input costs, combined with further upward pressure on wages, drove an unprecedented rise in average prices charged for goods and services in March, with rates of inflation reaching new highs in both manufacturing and services.

The Ukraine war and sanctions on Russia were also widely reported to have led to a worsening of supply chain delays, aggravating pandemic-related supply disruptions, including new delays from China amid fresh lockdowns. Having shown signs of moderating in February, average supplier delivery times lengthened in March to the greatest extent since last November.

An additional impact of the invasion was evident on business sentiment, as tracked by the PMI’s future output expectations index, which fell in March to its lowest since October 2020. Expectations of output in the coming year fell to the lowest since November 2020 in the service sector, and down even further in manufacturing to the lowest since May 2020. Backlogs of work, another indicator of future business activity, meanwhile rose at the slowest rate for a year.

Despite the drop in business optimism and weakening order book trend, firms again took on more workers to help alleviate current staffing shortages. Employment growth accelerated for a third month running to the highest since last November, though an increased rate of jobs growth in services was partly offset by slower hiring in manufacturing.

By country, France bucked the slowdown trend with business activity rising at the fastest rate since last July, as rebounding service sector activity offset a marked slowing in the manufacturing sector and rising domestic demand countered a marked drop in exports.

Growth meanwhile slowed in Germany but remained above that seen in the four months prior to February thanks to sustained expansions in both manufacturing and services, though in both cases rates of increase moderated from February and exports fell.

Output growth in the rest of the region as a whole also slowed. Barring the near-stalling seen in January amid the onset of the Omicron wave, the expansion was the weakest for a year, with growth slowing in both sectors but most notably in services.

Japan: Decline in private sector activity eases in March

At 53.2 in March, the headline au Jibun Bank Flash Japan Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI)® rose from 52.7 in February to signal a moderate improvement in operating conditions. Output returned to expansion territory in the latest survey period, albeit only marginally. That said, new order growth continued to slow, with the latest data pointing to the softest rise in six months.

Manufacturers continued to signal severe supply chain disruption, as supplier delivery times lengthened to the greatest extent since April 2011 amid material shortages, notably for semiconductors. This strengthened inflationary pressures further, pushing input price inflation to the highest since August 2008, with firms reporting higher energy, oil and semiconductor prices.

image

The au Jibun Bank Flash Japan Services Business Activity Index rose from 44.2 in February to 48.7 in March, indicating the softest decline in services activity in the current three-month sequence. Positively, new business inflows returned to growth as COVID-19 restrictions were eased, albeit at a fractional pace overall. Concurrently, input price inflation quickened for the second month running to reach the highest since last December. In turn this contributed to a renewed rise in prices charged. Moreover, service providers noted the softest degree of optimism regarding the year ahead outlook for activity since January 2021.

image

We get the U.S. flash PMI later this morning. But here’s the March Sales Managers Index from World Economics:

Dramatic Falls in US Sales Managers March Survey

The US Sales Managers March Survey, researched entirely after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, shows a steep decline in sentiment across all indexes.

Business Confidence on business prospects for the next few months, already steeply falling in the days immediately prior to the invasion moved to a 16 month low, at the 50 “no growth” level.

The Sales Growth Index fell an alarming 4 points to an index reading of 49.6, a 19 month low, taking sales sentiment back to the gloomy Covid days of August 2020.

image

The Staffing Index fell even further below the 50 line, to an Index reading of 48.5, a 13 month low.

The Headline Sales Managers Index also fell to a new 16 month low at an Index reading of 49.5. Longer term worries came to the fore in March with sharply contrasting views from many respondents indicating worries about sales growth prospects in the markets in which they operate, reflecting the as yet unknown impact of the Russian invasion on different sectors of activity.

Price Inflation remained a serious worry in many sectors with the Price Index continuing to register very high levels around the 58 mark, indicating continuing Price inflation far above levels seen for most of the past decade.

Finally the Profit Levels Index reflected a sharp reduction in margins in the month, associated in many cases with the expectation of rising costs associated with the new war, notably energy related.

   image image
The Odds Don’t Favor the Fed’s Soft Landing Inflation is higher, the labor market tighter and real rates more negative than in past periods when the Fed raised rates without causing a recession

(…) In 1965, 1984 and 1994, the Fed raised interest rates enough to cool an overheating economy without precipitating recession, he [Powell] noted, adding it may have done the same in 2019 but for the Covid-19 pandemic.

Unfortunately, history isn’t on his side. Inflation is much further from the Fed’s objective, and the labor market, by many measures, is tighter than in previous soft landings. Yet the Fed starts with real interest rates—nominal rates adjusted for inflation—much lower, in fact deeply negative. In other words, not only is the economy already traveling above the speed limit, the Fed has the gas pedal pressed to the floor. The odds are that getting inflation back to the Fed’s 2% target will require much higher interest rates and greater risk of recession than the Fed or markets now anticipate. (…)

History and the Fed’s own models are pretty clear: When inflation is too high, pushing it down requires damping demand and pushing up unemployment so that workers and firms must settle for lower pay and prices. Yet the median projections released by Fed officials show no such thing: They anticipate core inflation falling to 4.1% at the end of this year, 2.6% next year, and 2.3% in 2024 while unemployment stays near a 50-year low of 3.5% to 3.6% for the entire period. (…)

Suppose goods inflation drops to its pre-pandemic rate of around zero. If services inflation continues at its recent pace, overall inflation will stay above 3%. (…)

Since December, bond yields have risen sharply but so has expected inflation, so real yields are still deeply negative. Fed officials project their federal-funds rate target will peak at 2.8% next year. If inflation is above 3%, that is a negative real rate. (…)

In fairness, there are several unusual features to today’s economy that support the case for a soft landing. Unlike in the past, high inflation now results from strong demand interacting with constrained supply. Higher interest rates may reduce demand, such as the number of bidders per house or the waiting list for new cars, thereby reducing prices but not the number of houses and cars sold. Job openings are 70% higher than the number of unemployed. Reduced demand for labor could mean the same number of workers get hired but at lower wages than otherwise.

Second, the labor force shrank during the pandemic due to early retirements, child-care issues and Covid-19. As the pandemic recedes, the Fed expects the labor force to bounce back, allowing employment and output to grow briskly without pushing unemployment down further or putting upward pressure on wages.

Still, history doesn’t provide much precedent for those things. If they don’t pan out, and supply chains don’t swiftly normalize, then the Fed will likely have to accept higher inflation—which Mr. Powell said isn’t in the cards—or raise interest rates until unemployment rises. In theory, that can happen without a recession. That, too, would be unprecedented.

Greg Ip omits one important variable in the wage inflation picture: if productivity grows sufficiently to allow wages (unit labor costs) to rise without a complete pass through, prices may not need to be hiked too much to preserve profit margins, avoiding the dreaded wage-price spiral.

fredgraph - 2022-03-24T053851.198

The problem is forecasting productivity …

The hope is we get a repeat of the productivity boom of the 1996-2004 period thanks to rising capex and pandemic-induced investments in tech tools.

fredgraph - 2022-03-24T054441.422

While total capex are finally rising, IT spending is nowhere near its pre-2000 level.

fredgraph - 2022-03-24T055130.653

David Rosenberg: Yes, my resolve at being a bond bull is being tested – but a sea change in markets is now imminent

(…) We have gone into a contraction in real economic activity 90 per cent of the time in the past when both fuel and food prices have shot up as much as they have already. The overall economy is not in recession yet, but incomes are, even with the “hot” jobs market. That’s because in real terms – and recessions/expansions are determined by real (not nominal) variables – wages have contracted in each of the past five months and in six of the past seven (this landed the economy in an official recession 75 per cent of the time in the past). (…)

Tack on the food crisis to energy, and we are talking about a 2 per cent hit to discretionary spending, which is enough to tip the odds for a consumer recession — unless the household sector does end up dipping heavily into its “rainy day” fund (that came courtesy of last year’s Biden-led untargeted stimulus checks).

Statistics can be interpreted many ways. The Employment Cost Index is probably the best gauge for wage trends. The red line is real wages, down from their Q2’20 peak but still (barely) above their pre-pandemic level. The blue line is the YoY change in the red line, real wages, down 1.6% in Q4’21. Note how such a drop did not trigger a recession in 2005 nor in 2011.

fredgraph - 2022-03-24T064215.270

The next chart is real weekly earnings of employees other than those in managerial positions. That series sometimes has compositional biases but it does show that staff workers’ real wages, though down sequentially recently, remain nearly 5% above their pre-pandemic levels.

fredgraph - 2022-03-24T063625.087

That said, hurdles to consumer spending and the overall economy will be getting worse as Goldman Sachs explains:

We estimate that price increases for oil, natural gas, and agriculture over the last year represent 1.9% of US consumer spending, even larger than the 1.2% shock in 1990 recession and similar to the 1.8% shock in 2008. Higher commodity prices erode the real incomes of consumers and are a key reason we forecast GDP growth of just +1.9% this year (Q4/Q4 basis). We also forecast below-potential growth in the first half of the year, when the impact of commodity prices should be largest.

The largest headwinds to real spending growth in 2022 are the pullback in government transfer payments and high inflation that will weigh heavily on real income growth. We forecast that real household income will only grow by ½% on a Q4/Q4 basis in 2022, and our distributional income and inflation estimates imply an even worse outlook for lower-income households. Additionally, rising interest rates will likely challenge durable goods spending, and low consumer sentiment will likely be a headwind to spending.

The largest tailwind to spending is the ongoing recovery of virus-sensitive services spending, which should pick up going forward since consumers appear less concerned about virus risks post-Omicron. Additionally, household net worth has increased to a very high level, and many households will be able to support spending by drawing down savings.

We put weight on both sets of signals, and expect that a recovering service sector and spend out of savings will keep real PCE growth positive in 2022, but that weak income growth will weigh on spending, particularly for lower-income consumers. (…) we now forecast real PCE growth of +0.6%/+2.0%/+2.5%/+2.25% in 2022Q1-Q4, implying a modest upgrade to our 2022 GDP forecast to +0.5%/+2.25%/+2.75%/+2.25% in Q1-Q4 (vs. +0.5%/+1.5%/+2.5%/+2.5% previously) and +1.9% on a Q4/Q4 basis (vs. +1.75% previously; +2.7% consensus).

It’s the lower income group that will take the brunt. Goldman “forecast discretionary cash inflows to decline y/y by -27% and -12% for the bottom two quintiles, which together reflect about 15% of total inflows.”

The Chase card spending tracker, updated through March 19, is not showing a collapse in nominal sales. Control sales are currently estimated up 0.5% MoM in March after -1.2% in February.

⛽ U.S. gas demand is showing signs of a slowdown. The weekly demand figure has fallen for two consecutive weeks. (Bloomberg)

  • Canada: Surging food and energy prices already equal to 3 rate hikes! (NBF)
U.S. New Home Sales Fell for Second Consecutive Month

New single-family home sales fell 2.0% m/m (-6.2% y/y) to 772,000 units at an annual rate in February from a downwardly revised 788,000 in January (initially 801,000). The downward January revision was more than offset by a 21,000 upward revision to December. The most recent peak in sales was 993,000 in January 2021. The Action Economics Forecast Survey expected sales of 813,000 sales in February. Supply continues to revive as the number of new homes for sale rose to 407,000 in February, the highest reading and the first above 400,000 since August 2008.

By region, sales in February fell in two major regions and rose in the other two. Sales jumped 59.3% m/m in the Northeast in February to 43,000 at an annual rate following a 20.1% m/m drop in January. Sales rose 6.3% m/m to 84,000 in the Midwest after an 8.1% m/m decline in January. By contrast, sales in the South edged down 1.7% to 451,000 in February on top of a 5.4% m/m drop in January while sales in the West decreased 13.0% m/m to 194,000 after a 12.6% monthly decline in January.

The median price of a new home declined 6.3% m/m (+10.7% y/y) in February to $400,600 following a 7.1% m/m increase in January. The average sales price of a new home rose 3.4% m/m (+25.4% y/y) in February to a record high $511,000. These sales price data are not seasonally adjusted.

The seasonally adjusted supply of new homes for sale rose to 6.3 months in February from 6.1 in January. The record low was 3.5 months reached in August, September and October of 2020. The median number of months a new home stayed on the market fell to 2.5 months in February, tying the record low reached in October, from 2.9 months in January. These figures date back to January 1975.

 image image

  • CalculatedRisk says that builders are still reporting strong demand. Supply constraints are limiting deliveries:

The inventory of new homes under construction is at 4.1 months (blue line) – well above the normal level. This elevated level of homes under construction is due to supply chain constraints. And 106 thousand homes have not been started – about 1.7 months of supply (grey line) – almost double the normal level. Homebuilders are probably waiting to start some homes until they have a firmer grasp on prices.

  • About 40% of Americans live in apartments, and there’s a huge demand for more. RealPage projects that 426,000 apartment units will be built in the U.S. this year, representing a 30-year high in such activity, Smart Cities Dive reports. (Axios)
  • Build-for-rent developers are buying plenty of land.

Build-for-rent operators are actively buying land across the country, according to our Residential Land Broker Survey. Many of these BFR operators are competing for the same lots both public and private builders are also bidding for, particularly on higher density parcels.

The build-for-rent share of land purchased has grown over the course of the last couple years, as a flood of capital and rising single-family rents drive demand for development sites.

BFR operators are buying land most actively in:

  • Southeast = 9% to 14% of lots (finished lots, entitled land / paper lots, raw land)
  • Southwest = 10% to 11% of lots (entitled land / paper lots and raw land)

Public builders are also pursuing single-family rental and build-for-rent despite a hot for-sale market. They are building entire communities for rental operators, selling one-off homes to operators, or building, renting and then selling the homes themselves. (John Burns Real Estate)

BTW:

unnamed - 2022-03-24T072518.741

Data: Kastle Systems. Chart: Axios Visuals

China Envoy Says Xi-Putin Friendship Actually Does Have a Limit

Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin declared a “no limits” friendship between China and Russia before the Olympics began. Two months and a war later, Beijing’s envoy to the U.S. has added an important caveat. 

“China and Russia’s cooperation has no forbidden areas, but it has a bottom line,” Ambassador Qin Gang told state-backed broadcaster Phoenix TV on Wednesday. “That line is the tenets and principles of the United Nations Charter, the recognized basic norms of international law and international relations.”

“This is the guideline we follow in bilateral relations between China and any other country,” Qin added, responding to a question about Beijing’s commitment to Moscow following its Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine.

The remarks are the first from a Chinese official clarifying a lengthy joint statement released by the two countries last month that heightened concerns among U.S. allies about a rejuvenated China-Russia bloc. (…)

Jake Sullivan, the U.S. national security advisor, said Wednesday administration officials “have not seen the Chinese government move forward on the supply of weapons, but it’s something we’re watching every day.” (…)

Xiao Bin, a research fellow at the state-backed Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, last week noted that China and Russia’s strategic partnership “emerged from a state of no war,” saying that the subsequent invasion had changed those dynamics. “Therefore, China-Russia relations certainly have upper limits, which are the interests of the Chinese people,” he wrote on the website of the China-United States Exchange Foundation. That post is still available on China’s internet.

“In other words, relations should be constrained to areas that don’t harm those interests,” Xiao added. (…)

NATO estimates Russian combat deaths topped 7,000.
Russia Central Banker Wanted Out Over Ukraine, Putin Said No Russia’s highly regarded central bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina sought to resign after Vladimir Putin ordered an invasion of Ukraine, only to be told by the president to stay, according to four people with knowledge of the discussions.
Powell Flags Risks of New Digital Financial Products Fed chief highlights potential financial stability worries from proliferation of private cryptocurrencies

(…) “There are potential financial-stability concerns for some products,” Mr. Powell said. “We don’t know how some digital products will behave in times of market stress.”

He said the central bank would be guided by a principle of “same activity, same regulation,” which means that activities that are regulated in the banking system needed to be subject to the same rules if those activities migrate outside of the regulated banking sector. (…)

THE DAILY EDGE: 23 MARCH 2022

CONSUMER WATCH

From Morning Consult:

Rising energy costs are forcing many households to allocate a higher share of total spending to gas and utilities. Many adults rely on personal vehicles to commute to work, and cold winter temperatures across the country make heating essential to a functioning household. Consumers therefore have little choice but to absorb higher gas and utility bills and pay larger monthly amounts.

image

As spending on gas and utilities increased in recent months, purchases for services like health care, education, restaurants and travel, as well as spending on consumer products like apparel and furniture trended lower. In contrast with gas and utilities, many of these categories are more likely to be discretionary.

image

Despite the headwinds facing U.S. adults, spending intentions remain relatively optimistic. Consumers are slightly more likely plan to spend more in March than to intend to cut back on purchases. So far, rather than suppress overall consumer demand, rising prices — including for gas — have mostly impacted consumers by reshaping spending allocations.

However, there are indications that spending momentum may start to fade. Morning Consult’s Daily U.S. Index of Consumer Sentiment — which tends to be a leading indicator of spending — has been sliding lower through early March, falling below the previous low set in April 2020 during the early days of pandemic fallout. Weekly retail sales estimates from the Chicago Fed Advance Retail Trade Summary (CARTS) showed deterioration in spending levels at the end of February, suggesting weakening conditions heading into this month.

Through mid-March, daily gas prices grew an additional 70 cents per gallon, equating to a 19% jump, compared with a 7% increase from the end of January to the end of February. Oil prices are beginning to retreat, but the magnitude of the elevation in price levels suggest the impact of gas prices on spending is likely to be even more pronounced in March than in February. (…)

  • In March, consumer confidence dropped 7% for those earning more than $100,000 — a much larger dip than for those earning less than $50,000, according to a measure of consumer sentiment out today as part of the Morning Consult/Axios Inequality Index. (Axios)

unnamed - 2022-03-23T075443.646

Data: Morning Consult/Axios Inequality Index. Chart: Kavya Beheraj/Axios

Dallas Fed Warns Cutoff of Russian Energy Could Cause Global Recession Downturn appears ‘unavoidable’ if bulk of Russian oil and gas products are off the world markets for the rest of the year, according to a report by the regional Fed bank

“If the bulk of Russian energy exports is off the market for the remainder of 2022, a global economic downturn seems unavoidable. This slowdown could be more protracted than that in 1991,” the bank said in a report written by staff economists Lutz Kilian and Michael Plante. (…)

“Unless the Russian petroleum supply shortfall can be contained, it appears necessary for the price of oil to increase substantially and to remain elevated for a long period to eliminate the excess demand for oil,” the report said. “This demand destruction is likely to be assisted by the recessionary effect of higher natural-gas prices and other commodity prices, especially in Europe.”

Meanwhile “the surge in global fuel, electricity, residential natural gas and food prices, as well as the supply-chain disruptions caused directly by the invasion of Ukraine and indirectly by the sanctions against Russia, will sustain inflationary pressures in 2022,” the authors wrote. (…)

More from the Dallas Fed report:

Russia accounts for about 10 percent of global petroleum production. Its crude production exceeds 10 mb/d. It is also a major exporter to world markets, exporting about 5 mb/d of crude oil and close to 3 mb/d of petroleum products. Russia’s main customers include Belarus and China as well as countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

(…) much of the Russian oil that continues to be exported from Baltic and Black Sea ports at steep discounts is not delivered to refiners, as is customary. Instead, trading houses are purchasing the oil and keeping it in commercial storage in Europe, from where it may be potentially resold, bypassing financial sanctions. Buying oil for storage is not prohibited under current sanctions. (…)

It might seem that Europe could cushion the impact of the natural gas and oil shortages by delaying the mothballing of coal and nuclear power plants, but Europe also depends on Russia for 40 percent of its supplies of coal and, more importantly, for natural and enriched uranium. (…)

One reason the 1990 oil supply shock was associated with only a brief U.S. recession was Saudi Arabia’s decision to offset the shortfall of oil production to the best of its ability, making the net shortfall smaller than the original supply shock.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, however, have already signaled that they will not provide relief this time. This decision reflects the growing strategic cooperation between OPEC and Russia as much as the limited spare capacity of OPEC oil producers.

Likewise, the ability of shale oil producers in the United States to significantly boost oil production in the short run is constrained by supply-chain bottlenecks, labor shortages and the insistence of public investors on capital discipline. (…)

Hypothetically, the U.S. could release as much as 4.4 mb/d of crude from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), but only for about three months. Additional volumes could be released after that period, but at much slower rate.

Global Bond Plunge Wipes Out $2.6 Trillion, Exceeding Losses of 2008 Financial Crisis

The Bloomberg Global Aggregate Index, a benchmark for government and corporate debt total returns, has fallen 11% from a high in January 2021. That’s the biggest decline from a peak in data stretching back to 1990, surpassing a 10.8% drawdown during the financial crisis in 2008. It equates to a drop in the index market value of about $2.6 trillion, worse than about $2 trillion in 2008.

The worst drawdown on record for global fixed incomeThat’s a blow to money managers accustomed to years of consistent gains, backstopped by loose monetary policy. (…) For investors, it means the allure of holding debt — even safe government bonds — is diminishing given how sensitive valuations are to interest rates, a measure referred to as duration.

(…) equities globally are still nursing losses of about 6% this year. (…)

Stocks as Inflation Hedge Is New Catch-All Narrative for Market Rally

Call them brazen, call them naïve, but stock investors are giving no sign of being daunted by the hottest inflation in decades or the accompanying surge in bond yields.

Their boldness has sent analysts in search of ways to explain how the S&P 500 Index has managed to rally in five of the last six sessions, even as the Federal Reserve promises higher rates while war rages in Europe and Treasury rates see the biggest two-day jump in two years.

One theory gaining traction is that equities are among the best assets to hold when consumer prices are spiraling.

“In inflationary environments, stocks have a distinct advantage over bonds — they’re linked to companies that can adjust pricing — whereas bonds, not so much,” said Lawrence Creatura, a fund manager at PRSPCTV Capital LLC. “Companies, on the other hand, can raise prices and you only have to go to your local 7-Eleven to observe that.” (…)

A look back at the 1970s and early ’80s inflationary period gives clues on the divergence. Nicholas Colas, co-founder of DataTrek Research, found that inflation ran at 159% during that period, while a home-prices index rose by the same amount. Yet the S&P 500 returned an aggregate 169%, showing that earnings can keep up with inflation even if macro growth slows, he said. (…)

Let’s pause here and look at the data. You really have to pick your dates carefully and be very patient and resilient during the “1970s and early 1980s” to achieve anything close to a positive return on your equity holdings:

image

Keep in mind that the S&P 500 index is not inflation adjusted. The U.S. CPI rose 130% between January 1971 and June 1981. Yes, profits tripled but P/Es were cut in half.

The Bloomberg article continues:

Jonathan Golub, chief U.S. equity strategist and head of quantitative research at Credit Suisse Securities, says the profits backdrop is “broadly supportive.” While some say higher commodities and other input costs put pressure on company margins, the data indicates that margins move in tandem with higher materials prices. That’s due to pricing power as well as operating leverage, and the recent surge in commodities is consistent with firmer margins this year, he wrote in a note.

I don’t have all the data to verify the above but a look at trends between the CPI and pretax corporate profits shows that accelerating inflation is generally not accompanied by accelerating profits. In fact, the opposite is the norm.

The statistical correlation between the S&P 500 Index and the U.S. core CPI is -0.39 since 1955.

It may not be fear of inflation that is convincing people to buy stocks, but a belief that someone is finally about to do something about it, according to Weston. He believes equities have perked up precisely because of the Fed’s stiffening resolve to bring prices under control.

“The fact is a Fed bringing out the big guns in May and using forward guidance to set the scene ahead of this may be welcomed by the equity market — they’ve weighed up the outlook and feel a credible Fed is a strong Fed, and higher rates are better than entrenched inflation,” he said.

The venerable Ed Yardeni:

The only tool that Fed has ever had to bring down inflation is to raise the federal funds rate until it causes a credit crunch and a recession that brings inflation down. That’s the lesson of history. Inflation has always declined as a result of recessions, i.e. hard landings. If the plan is to slowly raise interest rates to gradually slow demand resulting in a soft landing, then good luck with that!

El-Erian Says Cut Stock Holdings as Stagflation Concern Grows

(…) “I don’t think the market has factored in yet what’s going to happen to the economy,” he said. (…)

“The Fed is increasingly being forced to consider what is the least bad policy mistake it wishes to be remembered for: meeting its inflation target by causing a recession, or allowing high and potentially destabilizing inflation to persist well into 2023,” El-Erian wrote. (…)

“If you’re an asset allocator and someone comes up with the proposal that you should reduce equity, you’re going to say: ‘Where do I go?’” El-Erian said. “You go into cash? Hell, no. Inflation is 7.9% and we may touch 10%. You don’t want to go there. That’s a guaranteed negative real return. Bonds? Hell no, bonds are adjusting….You end up not reducing your allocation to equities but actually looking to increase them.”

But, he warned, the relative value of stocks may prove vulnerable. “My baseline, for what it’s worth, is we’re going to see a global stagflation, lower growth, higher inflation,” El-Erian said. “The equity market hasn’t quite priced that in yet because it’s still thinking in a relative space.”

Perhaps the only advantage of wearing white on one’s head…

John Authers: Fright in Bond Markets Feels Like 2007 All Over Again Contradictions in the U.S. economy are about to come to roost. The difference this time is high inflation.

I suppose I should be grateful. I’ve been writing regular markets commentary for a long time. If I haven’t seen it all, I’ve seen a lot. But the last few weeks provide a great antidote to ennui. I’ve never seen anything quite like this —  and as I lack experience, no, I’m not sure I can explain it or predict what happens next. (…)

Using the relative performance of exchange-traded funds tracking the S&P 500 and U.S. Treasury bonds with maturities of 20 years and more as proxies, the following chart shows how stocks have suddenly jolted into higher territory relative to bonds. In this century, there have been only four previous two-week periods when stocks beat bonds by this much. They’re circled on the chart, and as can be seen from the line showing the S&P 500 index in absolute terms, they all came at historic stock market bottoms, at historically good times to buy into stocks — the bear market bottoms of 2002, 2009, 2011 and 2020.  In all cases, the rebounds came after precipitous falls for the stock market. This year’s bad start for the stock market doesn’t really compare:

Past rallies of stocks relative to bonds signaled historic buying opportunities

D.O. again, for the record. In 2002, the trailing P/E was 19.3 and the Rule of 20 P/E was 21.5. Inflation was slowing and the Fed was clearly dovish. At the market bottoms of 2009, 2011 and 2020, the trailing P/E was 12.7, 12.3 and 13.9 respectively. The Rule of 20 P/E: 14.5, 14.3, 16.2. Current: 21.2 and 27.7 with inflation roaring and a clueless Fed clearly hawkish. But who is not clueless these days?

Authers continues:

Sharp increases in the cost of money matter a lot to the economy. They raise the discount rate to be applied to companies’ future cash flows and thus, all else equal, reduce their value. They make borrowing for a house more expensive and endanger the store of wealth represented by the housing market. And they make it more expensive for companies to repay or refinance their debt. In general, any rise in underlying Treasury rates will be magnified for companies, as credit spreads will also rise.

Looking at the credit market, we can see that this is indeed happening, although not yet to an extent that is any great cause for alarm. Yields for both investment grade and high-yield U.S. corporates have been higher in the recent past than they are now, even excluding the Covid shock of 2020. But the speed with which corporate yields are rising again gives the impression of a market process that is coming around from an anaesthetic injected to help it survive the trauma of the credit crisis back in 2008.

If all of this is ample cause for fright, there is also the issue of habit, and how traders and investors can be expected to respond to events of which they have no practical experience. Ten-year Treasury yields have been trending downwards steadily ever since Paul Volcker raised rates enough to cause a recession in the early 1980s. Every time it reaches the top of a cycle and touches or at least nears the downward trend line, a financial accident occurs.

In the chart below, the circles indicate the Black Monday crash of 1987, the Orange County and Tequila crises of 1994; the bursting of the dot.com bubble in early 2000; and the onset of the credit crisis in 2007. Then in early 2018, when the Fed’s tightening actually brought yields above their long-term trend, we witnessed the so-called “Volmageddon” selloff early in the year, when bets on volatility to stay low when spectacularly wrong, and the “Christmas Eve Massacre” selloff at the end. All that financial turbulence was enough to force the Fed to pivot and abandon its tightening:

When the 10-year yield breaches the trend, beware of a financial accidents

(…) The point of Volcker was that he eliminated inflation from the equation. The Fed relented and came to the rescue in all the crises and mini-crises of the last four decades because it could. Inflation wasn’t particularly high and nothing too much was lost by cutting rates. That isn’t true now. Two dei ex machina have appeared. The coronavirus, the money it caused to be printed, and the supply blockages it created helped jolt inflation sharply upward. And in the last month, Vladimir Putin has pushed inflation expectations still higher.

My reason tells me that equities are enjoying a false dawn as they’re recipients of the money coming out of bonds, and that we are about to be reacquainted with the bear markets in both bonds and stocks which come when rates have to rise to control inflation. (…)

Deutsche Bank to Hike Pay by 5.2% as Inflation Rages Deutsche Bank AG agreed to boost wages for 8,000 staff by 5.2% in two steps in a nod to accelerating inflation in Germany.
Half-hearted sanctions against Russia have already failed

(…) The US Treasury’s sanctions office (OFAC) has made life easier by leaving a loophole for sovereign debt repayments, concerned that there might otherwise be a Lehmanesque shock to global finance.

The uninterrupted flow of fossil revenues – at windfall prices – is enough to cover interest service costs and redemptions. Goldman Sachs even thinks that the central bank will be able to relax capital controls gradually.

We are facing the failure of western sanctions policy. Calibrated half-measures are not sufficient to change the Kremlin calculus or to dissuade Putin from a policy of attrition against civilian targets. (…)

Western sanctions against the central bank are not proving to be the killer blow supposed at first, and nor is the ejection of some Russian banks from the SWIFT nexus of global payments. There are too many deliberate exemptions. 

Goldman’s deep-dive into the effect of sanctions ought to end all wishful thinking. The US investment bank forecasts that the Russian economy will contract by 10pc this year, a bad recession but not an economic breakdown. Growth will then recover to 2.4pc next year and 3.4pc in 2024 as the country adjusts. Exports will be back to 98pc of prior levels by early next year. If so, Putin is not going to lose sleep over this. (…)

“If Russia were fully integrated into global supply chains, restrictions on imports and exports would be immediately destructive. However, Russia largely exports goods that are almost fully produced locally,” said Mr Grafe. (…)

Professor Moritz Schularick from Bonn University said an immediate halt to all purchases of Russian gas, oil, and coal, would cut German GDP by 3pc this year and cost around €120bn but is perfectly feasible. “The world wouldn’t end,” he said.

The possible measures are by now well known. Every one degree cut in home heating saves 10 billion cubic metres (BCM) of gas. If Europe dialled down from an average of 22 to 19 degrees, which happened in some states in the 1973 crisis, it could already cover one fifth of total Russian supply. Targeted sections of heavy industry can be rationed with a small loss of GDP.

As for oil, the International Energy Agency has just cut its forecast for global demand this year by 1.3m barrels a day (b/d). It has issued a 10-point plan for rapid cuts that could shave a use by a further 2.7m b/d without causing an economic crisis, chiefly by a string of temporary measures such as lowering speed limits by 10 km/h, car-free Sundays, and less air travel. Together these savings add up to 4m b/d, equal to most of Russia’s oil exports to Europe.

The issue is no longer whether it can be done but whether Europe has the political courage to try. What is clear is that western sanctions policy is the worst of all worlds. We are suffering an energy shock that is further inflating Russia’s war-fighting revenues.

While it is hard to separate the effect of sanctions from war disruption and market psychology, the current situation is intolerable. We are allowing Putin to exploit Russia’s leverage as a full-spectrum commodity superpower.

The spot price for ammonia in Europe has risen sevenfold this year, deliberately pushed higher by a Kremlin ban on fertiliser exports that has no other purpose than causing maximum chaos and probably a global food shortage over the next year. Shortages of nickel, palladium, and other metals are becoming critical.

It is a strategic imperative to bring this crisis to a head immediately by raising the ante. A total energy embargo would buttress the military resistance of the Ukrainian armed forces and test whether it is even possible for Putin to continue prosecuting a bungled invasion. 

As matters now stand, the sanctions have failed to achieve anything. It is Ukrainian resistance, and military kit mostly provided by the Anglo-Saxon powers of Nato and frontline EU states, that have so far held the line. Core Europe has done little more than bleat on the margins. (…)

Biden Administration to Stop Reimbursing Hospitals for Covid-19 Care for Uninsured Some people without health insurance will begin getting bills for Covid-19 treatments and testing after the Biden administration Tuesday starts winding down a federal program that reimburses providers for virus-related care for the uninsured.

(…) because it is running out of money. The administration and hospitals are urging lawmakers to approve more funding for the program. (…)

The administration said it will stop accepting claims for treatment and testing for uninsured people Tuesday, and the deadline for claims for administering vaccines is in two weeks.

After that, the medical bills for uninsured Covid-19 patients will depend on each hospital’s financial-aid policy and their prices, both of which can vary widely from one hospital to another. (…)

Some states set requirements. Prices for the same services are also sharply different across hospitals, with the uninsured often facing the highest prices. (…)

An estimated 9.6% of the population, or 31.1 million people, lacked health insurance in the first six months of 2021, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (…)

The White House says the lack of new congressional funding means it won’t be able to purchase a second round of boosters for the general public, should federal regulators authorize another dose of the vaccine. (…)

Administration officials say they also expect the funding issue to impact the supply of monoclonal antibodies. They are also closely monitoring a new variant, BA.2, that has triggered an increase in cases overseas.

“Our concern right now is that we are going to run out of money to provide the types of vaccines, boosters, treatments to the immunocompromised and others free of charge that will help continue to battle” the pandemic, White House press secretary Jen Psaki said Monday.

FYI:

Coming in 2022: A big leap in smart home technology Starting next year, consumers will be able to buy smart home devices — like thermostats, lighting systems and kitchen appliances — that can talk to one another through a new connectivity standard called Matter.