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YOUR DAILY EDGE: 16 June 2026

Trump Stages an Iran Retreat The regime gets financial relief to reopen Hormuz and hold more nuclear talks.

The WSJ Editorial Board (my emphasis)

President Trump is touting his latest cease-fire deal with Iran as peace in our time, but the world is more likely to see it as a strategic retreat short of achieving his war aims. To reopen the Strait of Hormuz, Mr. Trump is accepting Iran’s promises merely to negotiate over its nuclear program.

(…) we’ve supported the President’s Iran policy. We’ve done so because a nuclear Iran would be an existential threat, and because we want Presidents to succeed when they go to war (Confused smile).

(…) The result isn’t “Obama deal 2.0” because, unlike in 2015, Iran’s key nuclear facilities are in rubble and its enrichment of uranium has been halted for the first time in 20 years. The media critics and Democrats who now savage the President would have stood by while a nuclear bomb became a fait accompli, as in North Korea.

But there’s no denying that Mr. Trump is retreating from his main goals as political pressure has built at home and finishing the job requires greater military risk. (…) Mr. Trump simply didn’t want to endure higher oil prices for longer. This is his choice, not a strategic imperative. (…)

The U.S. blockade will end, as Iran de-mines the Strait on a timetable so traffic can be unrestricted. This seems to be Mr. Trump’s main goal, which will mean lower gasoline prices before the midterm elections. But Tehran says Hormuz won’t return to the status quo ante, and it claims it will charge “fees” not tolls, as if that’s more than a semantic difference.

The full memorandum of understanding text hasn’t been released, and Mr. Trump says some of it is “a little conceptual.” Which is the problem. It would defer most matters of the nuclear program to 60 more days of talks, with oil and other sanctions relief along the way in exchange for diplomatic progress.

This linkage is crucial, but pushing off the most difficult nuclear issues in talks with “dishonorable people” who don’t deal “in good faith,” as the President called them on Friday, doesn’t inspire confidence. (…)

Meanwhile, allowing oil exports will rescue the regime financially, and resuming sanctions enforcement won’t be easy when Iran can threaten the deal—and the Strait—in reply. Granting the regime access to billions of dollars in frozen funds before nuclear negotiations would be another bailout. Mr. Trump’s talk of investing in Iran suggests he’s making the Barack Obama mistake of thinking the revolutionary regime wants Iran to be a normal country. There’s no evidence it does.

The deal also includes no Iranian commitments on its missiles and terror proxies. These will be put off to “regional discussions” from which no one expects much. This poses risks to Israel from Hezbollah, which the deal could protect in Lebanon, as well as to the Gulf Arab states that bore the brunt of Iran’s attacks. An irony of this deal is that the Gulf states will need greater U.S. defense commitments if Iran is allowed to rebuild its missile arsenal—or they will make their own accommodations to Iran.

The biggest risk is if Mr. Trump sees this deal as a de facto partnership with Iran’s regime. Like Mr. Obama, he might overlook violations to strike the final deal or preserve it once it is signed. The people of Iran, whom Mr. Trump promised to help, would be the big losers.

Iran’s new leaders are likely to conclude that Mr. Trump has no desire for more conflict, and they will negotiate accordingly. Congress should scrutinize any final agreement Mr. Trump makes with Iran—and reject it if it props up a regime that still says “death to America.”

The Guardian:

(…) Of a dozen analysts and experts consulted by the Guardian since the news of a potential end to hostilities broke at the weekend, not one suggested the interim deal to be signed on Friday by representatives of Iran and the US would be any more than a temporary solution.

“It’s just a big Band-Aid and future conflict is like to come at some point,” said Neil Quilliam, a Middle East expert at London’s Chatham House. (…)

The interim deal now agreed does little more than commit both sides to further talks, while obliging Washington to lift its naval blockade of Iran and making Tehran allow free passage to all shipping in the strait of Hormuz, which usually carries a fifth of the world’s oil and liquid gas supplies but was blocked by Iran early in the war.

To the great displeasure of Israel, a ceasefire has been imposed once again in Lebanon as part of the interim deal and appears for the moment to be holding.

But such ceasefires count for little these days, said several experts, pointing to Gaza as an example, where almost 1,000 Palestinians have been killed since Donald Trump brokered an end to the war there last year. Israel has occupied more than 60% of the territory, Hamas has not given up its weapons, and there has been almost no progress towards a projected second phase of the deal, let alone the third, which was to have brought a massive reconstruction effort.

“Gaza is a case in point. The deal there didn’t contend with the past: the war crimes that had been committed. Nor the present: how to disarm Hamas. Nor the future: a pathway to a viable Palestinian state and a resolution of the conflict,” said Alia Brahimi at the Atlantic Council in Washington. “It’s almost as if … you can use the cover of a ceasefire to continue to achieve your aims, including military ones.”

But this was not possible in the Gulf, Brahimi said, because the strategic geography was different. (…)

The sharpest shock, however, is being felt in the Sunni Arab Gulf states, where the stability behind decades of economic growth and growing diplomatic heft has been sharply challenged. (…)

Washington’s clear unwillingness to accept significant losses, months of potential economic pain or domestic dissatisfaction send a clear message.

“A ‘superpower’ that is not ready to bear 100 casualties is not a superpower,” said Orbach. (…)

“The realisation that they can’t rely on the US is the point of consensus but otherwise [Gulf states] have all got different views of the best strategy going forward,” Hellyer said. “The Arab world has important and legitimate grievances with how Iran projects power and influence and none of these are being addressed.” (…)

“We know that Hormuz can be closed again, the Iranians have carried out strikes on Gulf states, and we have seen that whatever Israel and the US can do, Iran will take it. All the previous thresholds have been passed now.”

As to the “dishonorable people” who don’t deal “in good faith”, the WSJ should make a list of the numerous landmark international treaties, multilateral agreements, and organizations Trump has unilaterally withdrawn the United States from.

Stocks Have Even More Room to Fly if Hormuz Reopens

Front page of the WSJ:

(…) The latest Middle East developments added to the ledger of optimistic news and capped the market’s best three-session stretch since the May 2025 tariff de-escalation with China. Wednesday’s readout on lower inflation, followed by Friday’s blockbuster stock debut by Elon Musk’s SpaceX, had left investors feeling good about stocks heading into the weekend. (…)

“The market is interpreting this as the economy is going to get stronger,” said Joseph Brusuelas, chief economist at RSM. (…)

  • “A potential US–Iran agreement could catalyze a broad risk-on impulse across equities, supported by strong fundamentals,” Andrew Tyler, the bank’s head of global market intelligence, wrote in a Monday note.9Bloomberg)

The economy needs to get stronger fundamentals if one believes the most recent Fed Beige Book which compiles anecdotes from business contacts across the US. From the June 3 report: (my emphasis)

Weak labor market:

  • “Employment continued to decline somewhat. Wage inflation held steady at a modest pace—typical of its long-run average. Contacts reported less upward wage pressures over the period, but a few contacts shared that some staff are requesting wage increases because of higher fuel prices. Generally, firms’ expectations for future wage and compensation cost inflation remained steady” (Philadelphia)
  • “Employment in the Fifth District was unchanged in the recent period. Some firms reported improvement in labor availability.” (Richmond)
  • “Employment levels in the District were flat to slightly down over the reporting period as most firms continued to keep head counts even or adjust downward through attrition.” (Atlanta)
  • “Employment overall was mostly flat during the reporting period. Wage growth remained modest in the service sector but moderate in manufacturing. A services contact noted some relief in terms of pay demands from job candidates. Labor costs for homebuilders remained flat or declined due to reduced work volume in the single-family housing market” (Dallas)
  • “Labor market conditions have shown little to no change in the Tenth District, with employment remaining stable and wages increasing modestly.” (Kansas City)
  • “Employment levels were generally unchanged, with most employers holding head counts flat and hiring selectively. Wages rose slightly.” (San Francisco)
  • “Wage growth eased somewhat and remained modest.” (New York)
  • “Wage growth has been moderate.” (St. Louis)
  • “On balance, wage pressures remained moderate. Meanwhile, across sectors, multiple contacts noted easing wage pressures amid cooling labor demand. One construction contact noted that employees were ‘nervous and stressed’ and believed employees were reluctant to ‘risk’ leaving for higher-paying opportunities.” (Cleveland)
  • “Wage growth was modest to moderate, with some signs of softening.” (Minneapolis)

Very different from what the last BLS employment report suggested, in line with my own analysis (see Soccer Punch on June 8 and on June 10).

Weak consumer demand:

  • “(…) consumer-facing businesses reported decreased confidence.” (Boston)
  • “Retailers (nonauto) reported a modest decline in sales over the current period, after sales held steady last period.” (Philadelphia)
  • “Consumer spending declined slightly in recent weeks. Many retailers reported that higher fuel costs and related inflation had further dampened consumer spending, leading to decreased sales across various retail sectors including convenience and grocery stores, auto dealerships, and restaurants. One national retailer noted that consumers have become ‘extremely price sensitive’. Another contact noted an uptick in credit card use among customers, a situation which they believed to be a sign of financial stress.” (Cleveland)
  • “Consumer spending grew at a modest pace. (…) retailers and other consumer-facing businesses noted continued financial stress among middle- and lower-income households. Persistent price sensitivity contributed to slower restaurant traffic, increased promotional activity, and constrained demand even for lower-priced discretionary services. New auto sales were below expectations amid elevated MSRPs, interest rates, and gas prices.” (Atlanta)
  • “Luxury travel remained resilient, while more budget-conscious segments experienced a pullback. Additionally, groups and business travelers shortened their stays to manage costs.” (Atlanta)
  • “Consumer spending was flat since the last report.” (Minneapolis)
  • “(…) consumer-facing firms continued to report softer demand and margin compression. […] Consumer-facing contacts described growing behavioral adjustments among middle-income households, including reduced frequency and lower per visit spending at sit-down restaurants. One contact noted that ‘middle-income households are squeezing more life out of every dollar before deciding to spend it.’” (Kansas City)
  • “Retail sales weakened over the reporting period. Auto sales softened further in April and May, with dealerships experiencing a significant slowdown in customer traffic that they partly attributed to high gasoline prices and the resulting pullback in non-essential spending.” (Dallas)

  • “Retail sales were roughly flat over the reporting period.” (San Francisco)
  • “On the consumer side, one banker mentioned that credit card applications increased as consumers covered essential purchases like gasoline and groceries.” (Cleveland)

Inflation vs profit margins:

  • “Output prices rose slightly on average, although many firms left prices unchanged. Input prices increased modestly overall, but some contacts reported significant cost pressures.” (Boston)
  • “Most contacts did not plan to raise their output prices in the near term, even though many were concerned that cost pressures linked to the Middle East conflict could persist for a while.” (Boston)
    “Firms continued to report moderate increases in prices received for their own goods and services. However, a dichotomy has emerged. Increases in prices received by consumer-facing firms have held steady at about 2.0 percent for the past six months.” (Philadelphia)
    “Most contacts across many sectors reported a reluctance to raise prices, citing consumer price sensitivity and softening demand.” (Philadelphia)

US Manufacturing Output Stalls for the First Time This Year

US manufacturing production stalled in May after four months of gains as a drop in chemical and petroleum output masked ongoing strength in categories tied to the data center boom.

Factory output was little changed last month after an upwardly revised 0.7% advance in April, Federal Reserve data out Monday showed. The median estimate in a Bloomberg survey of economists called for a 0.3% advance.

The data showed a split between durable goods manufacturing, which continued to advance, and nondurable goods manufacturing, which was dragged down by declines in chemical and petroleum products. Output of synthetic dyes and pigments dropped 5.5% over the last three months, possibly reflecting supply-chain problems created by the war. (…)

“But far from representing a manufacturing renaissance, we estimate that factory output increased only in about one-third of categories.” (…)

Separate data Monday showed factory activity in New York state expanded only modestly in June after a strong advance in May. An index of future selling prices rose to the highest level since 2022, “suggesting that firms widely expect to raise their prices over the next six months,” according to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York report.

Goldman Sachs: “recent inflation readings and corporate commentary have signaled the risk to profit margins from input cost pressures. Our top-down macro model for the median S&P 500 company points to limited margin expansion through 2027.”

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Note how the 18x median P/E, while lower than the aggregate P/E is still historically high. Here’s the composition of the median P/E:

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From various GS recent write-ups:

  • “From a macro perspective, slowing economic growth and rising interest rates put pressure on equity valuations, but elevated corporate profitability helps justify elevated multiples.”
  • “From a bottom-up perspective, much of the earnings tied to AI investment spending warrants a below-average multiple. Compositionally, the Memory stocks driving a large share of S&P 500 earnings growth this year typically trade at low valuation multiples due to the cyclicality of their earnings. More broadly, earnings driven by a temporary investment boom should boost current equity valuations far less than earnings expected to be generated indefinitely. While some investors believe the AI investment boom is likely to last long enough that the associated earnings should be treated as secular, rather than cyclical, profit streams, enough investors remain skeptical that a major increase in valuation multiples seems unlikely.”
  • “The persistent gap between earnings and cash flows for some of the largest tech stocks should continue to weigh on their earnings multiples as well. The mega-cap hyperscalers AMZN, GOOGL, META, and MSFT trade at a collective P/E of 24x, near the low end of their range during the past decade, but at a price/FCF multiple greater than 150x. While last quarter’s reports appeared to give investors incremental confidence in the likely returns to hyperscaler capex spending, the likelihood of continued capital intensity in coming years suggests uncertainty around long-term future free cash flows will remain elevated.”
  • “The outlook for AI investment spending and earnings creates two-way risk to valuation multiples. While valuation multiples for many semiconductor companies have recently expanded, valuations in other parts of the AI infrastructure complex reflect a healthy skepticism regarding the persistence of current earnings strength. As the processes of AI build-out and AI adoption continue, a widening pool of companies perceived to be future winners will likely enjoy large boosts to their valuations, but it seems likely that many others will experience declining valuations as they are affected by AI disruption risk.”
  • “The biggest question for the valuations of most stocks in the market is the impact of AI on long-term earnings growth, but that question is unlikely to be resolved any time soon. One consequence is that near-term earnings will likely continue to be the primary driver of near-term equity returns. Most of the current value of an equity is attributable to earnings far in the future. The uncertainty surrounding which companies will experience long-term earnings uplifts from AI helps explain the practical focus of most investors on the near-term earnings impact from AI, even if the focus on near-term earnings creates the risk that investors overvalue the likely long-term earnings benefits of some AI infrastructure stocks.”

Understand?

Energy Shortages Loom Despite Peace Deal

John Dizard ia a veteran financial journalist and columnist known for his in-depth analysis of global macro investing, commodities, and currency markets, most notably for his 21-year tenure at the Financial Times. This is an excerpt from a long interview by Chris Whalen of the Institutional Risk Analyst. Instructive on what’s going on below the surface.

(…) We already have diesel prices that are going to be going up. If not hyperbolically, you know, very, very aggressively. And in the case of the Group III lubricants and even Group II lubricants that I’ve been obsessing about, we have an availability problem starting now.

Consider high-end lubricating oil. You take what’s called a base oil, which comes from a refinery, and then you put in additives for, say, winter or to avoid corrosion and oxidation. But they’re simply not there.

The shortages are hitting the formulators, the blenders right now. They just simply can’t get supplies of high-end lubricating oil. It’ll hit consumers over a lack of availability by the end of this month or beginning of next month.

Group III base oil is already, when you can get it, it’s at least $10 a gallon, but really, it’s on allocation. (…)

The diesel price increases that have happened so far are enough to increase prices all kinds of consumer goods already. That will now accelerate over the summer. (…)

The U.S. has become highly dependent on imported lubricants. For the higher end lubricants, Group III. as they’re called, or Group IV, the U.S. imports about 70% of its requirements. Of that. 40%, between 40 and 50% has come—- until March—- from the Gulf, from refiners in the Gulf, and about 30% has come from South Korea.

Neither of them are shipping product to the United States now. The Koreans have redirected their production to either domestic use and domestic OEMs, or maybe to some Korean OEM assemblers in the States.

The Gulf producers simply aren’t producing lubricants and other refined products. It’s almost as if the Iranians knew what the precise pressure point to strike because they knocked them all out. The Iranians seem to be better informed than the US government.

Let’s say that Trump’s peace deal sticks, will this solve the supply problem? No.

We’re going to be on allocation this year and into 2027. The trouble is that nobody we know— at the supplier level— is receiving any guidance from Washington. There’s no coordination of how that’s to be done. But the shortfall in supply is so severe, it looks as though it could impact the auto manufacturers as well.

These high-end lubricating oils are required for hybrid engines and many other products. For CVT transmissions, for compressor lubricant. For turbine lubricant. Aircraft engines. Where you have aircraft, where you have high temperatures, high pressures, continuous use. (…)

Production [of lubricants] has actually been reduced in the past couple of months globally, even after the knockout of the Gulf suppliers, because refiners have seen such a rapid increase in diesel prices that they committed to producing diesel and jet fuel rather than other products. The Koreans, for example, committed their feedstock supplies to producing diesel rather than producing lubricants. (…)

Diesel and jet fuel are both going to be problems. The government and the Trump administration has been taking credit for our high oil exports. Those export numbers include both oil and oil products. We’ve been exporting not only our excess sweet light crude and condensate from shale oil. We’ve also been exporting our inventories of diesel and diesel, and jet fuel in particular. (…)

You can’t even really start on rebuilding facilities like, say, Shell’s gas-to-liquids synthetic lubricant plant in Qatar, or repairing the Bahrain refinery or the Adnoc’s Abu Dhabi refinery, until you know the missile and drone attacks have really stopped. The Gulf States have set up— you know, warehousing for parts, and they’ve done surveys, they’ve done ordered parts, but to really start repairing these vast plants, they can’t even start yet. It’s at least a $50 billion to $60 billion repair bill. Again, it’s almost as if the Iranians knew more about our oil supply and our, you know, our oil product supply chain than the Trump Administration.

(…) what was really destroyed in the Gulf, it’s not just a matter of escorting ships to the Strait of Hormuz. It’s the disruption of the productive plant. And that’s the problem.

The Korean refiners can get up and running again with maybe four months delay. But the Gulf plants are offline until they get fixed. I think that supply disruptions of fuel and lubricants is going to be an acute issue going into the Fall elections. (…)

BTW:

but:

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Chinese Economy Stalls as Spending, Investment Drop to Covid-Era Levels

Retail sales declined 0.6% last month from a year ago, posting a worse-than-forecast drop that was their first fall since the reopening from Covid lockdowns in late 2022.

Home prices fell at a quicker pace in May and fixed-asset investment shrank a deeper-than-expected 4.1% in the first five months from a year ago, according to data released by the National Bureau of Statistics on Tuesday.

In contrast to weakness on the demand side, industrial production climbed 4.5%, up from 4.1% in April and slightly better than forecast. The surveyed urban jobless rate eased to 5.1%. (…)

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An export boom driven by artificial intelligence has become a new source of economic imbalance in China, lifting production as domestic consumer spending sags under the weight of a housing crisis and a fragile jobs market.

But without stronger demand at home, the economy is at risk of a deeper slowdown even as the US-Iran deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz holds out the promise of stabilizing global shipping and energy prices. (…)

The services production index, which inched up to 4.4% on year in May, has a stronger correlation with the pattern of growth in gross domestic product than retail sales, which comprised mostly goods, according to Yu Song, chief China economist at UBS Securities. Inconsistency in the fixed-asset investment data that became apparent last year also mean it might exaggerate the weakness, he said. (…)

Within investment, private capital expenditure slumped 7.1% in the first five months of 2026 from a year ago, the worst pace since 2020. Manufacturing investment declined for the first time in six years.

Further evidence emerged indicating a growing divergence in the economy. Investment in high-tech industries expanded 4.5%, with capital expenditure of semiconductor and lithium battery makers up 11% and 25%, respectively.

NBS spokesman Fu Linghui attributed the slump in investment and retail sales to factors including heavy rainfall. Fu also pointed to last year’s high level of spending driven by subsidies as well as the economy’s transition to new growth drivers. (…)

Car purchases, which make up about 8% of the overall figure, plunged 16% in May from a year ago. Excluding autos, retail sales grew 1.1% in May.

Sales of home appliances as well as construction and decoration materials also contracted at a double-digit pace.

A faster fall in home prices last month doesn’t bode well for consumer sentiment. Both new and second-hand homes declined in price at a quicker pace compared with April. (…)

The spurt of export growth this year has still been sufficient to keep China’s economy from cooling off too much. A global investment supercycle in artificial intelligence is driving up prices and demand for hardware made by the world’s manufacturing powerhouse.

Outbound shipments soared in May at their fastest pace in three months. Chips and computers contributed to about half the growth in both exports and imports, with overseas sales of semiconductors soaring 111%. (…)

The latest China Beige Book foresaw the slowdown: “China’s economy slowed across the board in April with investment resuming declines while retail sales and industrial output fell short of forecasts, underscoring the economy’s vulnerability in the face of a global energy crisis.”

SpaceX’s IPO was just the start

The IPO on Friday was just the beginning — over the next days and weeks, Wall Street is launching all kinds of ways to invest in the company and speculate on the direction of its stock price.

On Sunday night, Asian investors — mostly asleep on IPO launch day — started buying, pushing up the stock price in after-hours trading.

  • Then yesterday, the leveraged ETFs launched.
  • Today, SpaceX options are set to begin trading. Those give investors the ability to make leveraged bets on which way the stock moves.
  • And then, as we’ve reported, there will be the inclusion in stock indexes in the coming days and weeks.

This includes a lot of fanfare and product launches for an IPO it’s not typical.

More ways to make money also means that there are more ways to lose money. All these products amplify risks in the market.

The stock closed at $192.46 yesterday and is now up nearly 43% from its initial offer price of $135. (Axios)

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